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INTRODUCTIONS 
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF* 
 We are so pleased to be here with you today, our esteemed 
panelists, professors, alumni, and distinguished guests. Thank you so 
much for coming. We have an incredible group of scholars, 
policymakers and thought leaders here with us today. Many of my 
colleagues from The Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 
(“AELJ”) are here today as well. Thank you for being the best editors 
and staffers one could possibly ask for. A big thank you to our 
Acquisitions Editors, Danielle Gorman and Al Roundtree, who helped 
us develop our topic, and to our Senior Articles Editors, Cary Adickman 
and Ashleigh Hebert. And especially, thank you, Agatha Cole, our 
Executive Editor, without whom this symposium could not have come 
to fruition. Thank you also, Eric Einisman, Managing Editor, for 
making all of this possible. Thank you for your unyielding dedication to 
AELJ, and for your unwavering friendship. Today would also not have 
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been possible without the help of AELJ's faculty advisor, Professor 
Brett Frischmann, and Professors Peter Goodrich and Michael Burstein, 
who have gone above and beyond at every step of the way to make our 
symposium a success. On behalf of AELJ, thank you for all that you do 
to support our journal. Your guidance in crafting the symposium has 
been invaluable and we're so grateful to have your advisement and 
mentorship. 
Last but certainly not least, thank you to all of our panelists. It is 
an honor to have you with us today, and to have you share your 
thoughts on Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) and the politicization of 
Intellectual Property (“IP”) and information law.  
 It is because of the support of all of these people that AELJ has 
been cited three times by the United States Supreme Court, as well as 
the high courts of Canada and Australia, and it is, of course, a staple in 
the District Courts. It is also thanks to this support that I can proudly 
share with you that AELJ has maintained its top spot as the number one 
journal in the country for arts, entertainment, and sports law and has 
also maintained its rank among the top five print journals in the country 
and number one in New York State for IP law. That was a mouthful, but 
all good things. 
 I thank you again for joining us, as I turn things over to Agatha, 
who will give us a brief overview of our symposium topic. Thank you. 
 
EXECUTIVE EDITOR* 
Good afternoon, and thank you. As most of you already know, 
Cardozo's IP program, along with our esteemed journal, is recognized 
around the world for producing some of the most groundbreaking and 
significant work in IP and information law.  
Many of you may not already know, however, about our faculty's 
engagement in the CLS movement, and its influence both within and 
outside of legal academia. It was only after Jacques Derrida visited 
Cardozo for a symposium on deconstruction in law in 1990 that he 
turned to the question of justice, and effectively became a political 
activist. Derrida's subsequent work against apartheid in South Africa 
with Nelson Mandela is a tremendous inspiration to scholars who view 
the pursuit of political and socioeconomic justice as a central goal of 
their projects. 
 So what is CLS, you might ask, and how does it relate to politics, 
activism, and IP and info law?  As I'm sure we will see throughout the 
symposium, the very definition and scope of CLS is itself subject to 
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debate. Some scholars characterize CLS as scholarship that employs a 
particular methodology—more of a “means” than an “end.”  On the 
other hand, some scholars contend that CLS scholarship demonstrates a 
collective commitment to a political end goal—an emancipation of sorts 
—through the identification of, and resistance to, exploitative power 
structures that are reinforced through law and legal institutions. 
 After a brief golden age, CLS scholarship was infamously 
marginalized in legal academia and its sub-disciplines. But CLS themes 
now appear to be making a resurgence—at least in content, if not in 
name—in IP and information law scholarship. 
 Over the last year, our journal’s staff has noticed that 
contemporary IP and information law scholarship is increasingly post-
modern and interdisciplinary in nature. Themes that were originally 
associated with CLS are now making a regular appearance in legal 
scholarship about privacy, access, fair use, the public domain, and other 
topics related to IP and information law. 
 The conceptualization of identity and the author as social 
constructs and the rejection of law and economics principles, the 
identification of interdeterminancy and paradox in information 
networks, and the renewed emphasis on collectivity as a context or 
scholarship about commons management are all popular themes in 
recent IP and information law scholarship that are reminiscent of the 
CLS movement. 
 And just as the first wave of CLS scholarship was associated 
with the civil rights movement, the reemergence of CLS in the IP and 
information law context seems somewhat aligned with newly emerging 
manifestations of technologically inspired grassroots activism. 
 Why is the revival of CLS themes so apparent in IP and 
information law scholarship as compared to other legal sub-disciplines?  
Is it simply a manifestation of a significant cultural and historical nexus 
between IP and the humanities?  Or is the reemergence of these themes 
in the context of IP and info law scholarship politically motivated, as 
CLS scholars might posit? To what extent is the push for copyright and 
patent reform coincident or concurrent with emerging CLS themes in IP 
and information law scholarship?  Are the goals of CLS being realized, 
intentionally or not, in popular efforts to recontextualize IP and 
information law debates?  These are questions that we hope to examine 
in today's symposium. 
 Our first panel will focus on the resurgence of CLS in IP and 
information law scholarship, and our second panel will explore the 
relationship between critical work in legal academia, and political 
activism in the IP and information law policymaking realm. Finally, our 
third panel will examine the increased politicization of IP and 
information law policymaking, and how it may or may not intersect 
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with increasingly politicized nature of IP and information law 
scholarship.  
 With that brief overview, I am pleased to turn things over to 
Professor Peter Goodrich, who will lead our first panel. 
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PANEL I: CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
PETER GOODRICH*  
SONIA K. KAYAL*  
REBECCA TUSHNET*  
 
PETER GOODRICH: I won't lead so much as follow but many thanks to 
Sarah and Agatha. One of the most remarkable features of today's event 
lies in the fact that it is entirely student led, student driven, student 
motivated, and student organized. So just a few words about Critical 
Legal Studies (“CLS”), because the only reason I'm here is that I am a 
relic. 
 I was around when critical legal studies was around, and I was at 
Cardozo briefly in the 1980's, when in 1985 there was a symposium on 
critical legal studies which was published as a special issue of the then 
youthful Cardozo Law Review. Volume 6, Issue 4 is a “Symposium on 
Critical Legal Studies” and states confidently, youthfully, in the 
introduction that the symposium shows “that CLS, however defined, is 
flourishing and thereby transforming the broader law school 
community.” More than that, better yet, the “spirit of participation in the 
symposium itself is a tribute to CLS.” And then, for the spirit of it, and 
in honor of the unnamed students, the corporate fiction that signs the 
introduction as The Editorial Board, “A law school is far from an ideal 
participatory community, but CLS has urged us to pursue exhaustively 
our capacity for human relations.” The students are gone, Sarah and 
Agatha have taken their place and it also bears note that a number of the 
Cardozo faculty were involved in that symposium. Some have moved 
on. Some are still here, but they're not here today. And that leads me to 
one of the themes in the conference, which takes the form of the 
paradoxical aperçu that critical legal studies is dead and that it is 
resurgent in a new generation, in novel doctrinal spaces and in 
distinctive forms of practice. 
 Nietzsche comments somewhere, "beware of killing your enemy 
because you will thereby immortalize him." And I think that it's true to 
say that critical legal studies in various senses has been immortalized, or 
at least that despite its anathematization in the US legal academy, it has 
nonetheless come back, and come back, and come back but in different 
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bodies of substantive analysis and in subtly distinctive guises. It hasn’t 
carried any identity cards, it hasn’t remained the same, in being in 
essence a movement, it took the opportunity, one can at least 
hypothesize, of moving on. Wasn’t that the point?   
Professor Ekstrand whose paper was one of the inspirations for the 
conference, cites Duncan Kennedy at one juncture as stating that critical 
legal studies is “dead, dead, dead.” But Ekstrand doesn't note that 
Duncan is a Catholic who belives that if you deny something three 
times, you thereby affirm it; and it is that cryptic affirmation that 
constitutes the ‘backface’ of CLS, that marks in enigmatic form that it 
subsists, and that it will live on, even if, in an introduction to the 2003 
reprint of Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 
Kennedy does wittily observe that “the conference turned out to be an 
idea whose time was then.” He states that it failed, and there is a strong 
sense in which it gives every appearance of being dead, buried in the 
interstices of the institution and in the repressed memories of members 
of the movement. But the appearance of necrophilia transpires to be best 
understood as a strategy of discovery, of transmutation that has gone 
along with the movement, with the trajectory of the theory.  
From its inception, CLS designated, amongst other substantive 
topics, the pact of withdrawn selves, the articulation of alienation, the 
expression of the unconscious, reverie, fantasy, and transmogrification 
into spiritual practices. The anima legis of CLS, the souls of the 
departed, the evidence of the repressed, are precisely the marks of what 
lives on, they are the index of a structure of revolt. 
 The latter point, the semiotics of the movement, the icons and 
other signs of a trans-historical mobility, and here I risk falling into my 
own idiosyncratic historical obsessions, are precisely what live on and 
what matter to the next generation. We are witness to a moment of 
potential extravagance and palpable enthusiasm. Something has been 
unearthed. The repression barrier momentarily lifted so as to glimpse 
the spirit of the movement, the energy of rebellion as it links to the 
smooth spaces and liquid sociality of the digital. CLS, IRL, in a virtual 
age.  
So the question of defining what CLS was becomes the more 
radical inquiry into what CLS can and did do, and even perhaps, a 
specific instance, an infinite particular, what did it do at Cardozo? 
Agatha has already addressed this in part, in her opening today, literal 
and metaphorical, and has described affectionately and extravagantly 
the role that Derrida played at Cardozo, and less expectedly the part 
played by the Law School in radicalizing Derrida. It was after becoming 
a Fellow at Cardozo that he shifted to a more political trajectory and 
engaged with the fight to free Mandela and end apartheid. I think he 
would have been surprised to learn that Cardozo radicalized him but 
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why not? It was a two-way street, and recollecting the atmosphere and 
passions that circumambulated 55 Fifth Avenue back then, I think it is 
fair to say that Drucilla Cornell who was here at the time was a political 
powerhouse that few could avoid if they walked through the corridors 
where the faculty live.  
 And Derrida is why I arrived. I came because he was here. That 
was the spirit of the post-1960s as they lived in the 90s. I came to visit 
Cardozo because I had learned of the conference on Deconstruction and 
the Possibility of Justice, and because I met two Cardozo faculty, 
Michel Rosenfeld and Chuck Yablon at a conference on legal semiotics, 
and then I met Drucilla Cornell, when I gave a paper sometime later at 
Cardozo. So I came by chance, by accident, by coincidence and by 
volition. I came because of the movement, because of CLS, because I 
managed to slip through that rapidly closing window that the radicals 
had opened up to theory, to deconstruction, to the possibilities of the 
postmodern mind.  
So critical legal studies, finally just a few words. I'm European. I 
was chair of the English Critical Legal Studies Conference for a period 
and I founded what was self-consciously supposed to be a critically 
motivated law school in the University of London, at Birkbeck College, 
a School that remains a critical legal enterprise in its fashion, in its 
parts, and mostly in some of its scholarly self-representations. So 
critical legal studies lives on elsewhere, it survived even in institutional 
terms as part of the identity of a number of European law schools, some 
way from the USA, and perhaps this is always the case, the center 
becomes the periphery, and then the periphery returns. 
 Critical legal studies grew out of the Marxist Study Group, and it 
was historical materialism that lay behind the 1977 Wisconsin Critical 
Legal Conference. It was historical materialism that provided the early 
theoretical and political structure of critical legal studies both in Europe 
and in the United States. It was a leftist movement and when we talk 
about leftism, I mean quite precisely that there is a historical and 
material basis to what law does, to what people do to one another, and 
that cases are actions by persons against other persons, whether dressed 
up as corporate fictions, as law or as individual and paradoxical real 
personae.  
 In the same sense that the left declined, I think that critical legal 
studies declined. But to decline is also to conjugate, to match tenses and 
to arrive at new constructions. That is at least how I interpret it. The 
decline that in his more melancholic moods is seen by Kennedy and 
others as a diagnosis, as a negative, a failure, is also an opportunity and, 
I think perhaps it is a prognosis that it is best interpreted and expanded. 
Viewed in the positive, as a productive failure, it is the decline that 
allowed for the reinvention and mirrors the new social movements, the 
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anti-globalization and “occupy” networks that have marked the 
transition of the left all the way from class struggle to rebel clown 
armies.  
Consider the melancholic pall of Perry Anderson’s analysis in 
Considerations on Western Marxism where he articulates the inexorable 
trajectory of leftist movements in Europe from practice to melancholia 
to aesthetics. That's the summary given by Anderson of what happened 
to the Western Leftist Movements and I think one could say that a 
similar sort of diagnosis can be offered of what happened within critical 
legal studies—that it moved from practice, from radical and rebellious 
lawyering, from confronting authority, to institutionalization, where a 
mixture of ennui, embarrassment and exit, marked the destiny of the 
CLS radicals within the legal academy. At the same time, however, they 
mostly remained, they taught, they published, they forged links with the 
outside of the law school and with its temporal other, the next 
generation of scholars and students. So we prepare our own exit, we 
prepare to be, as Derrida put it in Specters of Marx, no more one, more 
than one. It is in that pluralization, in a dispersal that is equally a 
dissemination, that we make links with the past, with the images of 
critique and of the movement, in which we become ourselves, bit by bit, 
ever more virtual.  
 The left moved from being a working class movement to being a 
force within the institution, a path into the universities, and then within 
the university a shift from materialist polemics to aesthetic politics. I 
have suggested a similar species of trajectory for CLS. In the late 1970s 
and 80s, CLS was engaged with the ‘Law and Society Association’, 
which is where the legal Marxists were originally located, and then the 
same move from practice to the melancholia of institutional 
inhabitation, time and passage. But this mix of nostalgia and benign 
senescence is also the most fertile of grounds for imagination. The 
melancholia is in the main personal, idiosyncratic, and individualistic. 
Duncan Kennedy is perhaps uneasy and unwilling to let go. I think that 
a number of the others, myself included, are equally unable to give up 
on our own earlier fate and with it the afterlife of the movement. The 
cause is as much the loss of our youth as it is the state of the world, as 
much a matter of existential style as of radical disengagement, and then 
there is the fact that the only color we have left is in our accouterments. 
 So CLS moves into the institution, into specialisms, splinter 
groups, and other spent spaces, but the third phase, the trinity that I 
would now suggest is happening, and that we see embodied in our 
panelists, if not in me, is the shift to aesthetics. Aesthetics is in large 
measure the study of images. It is thus, in origin and substance, the 
study of the virtual, of representation and depiction as such. The law 
relating to the image goes back to the extraordinary Roman case law on 
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painted tablets, where the big question was that of whether an artist who 
paints on my tablet becomes the owner of the tablet or whether the 
owner of the tablet comes to possess the image?  And the answer given 
in classical Roman law was that the artist owned the tablet because 
spirituality has precedence over materiality, the imaginary over the 
quotidian and tellurian.  
 The reason for the priority of the image is classically piety. The 
visual representation manifests the invisible more directly and 
affectively. The image, the contentment of sight, gives the picture a 
greater power than that of mere materiality. The image belongs to the  
spiritual order of being, to an imaginary world that subtends and 
structures that of presence. Such is not on its surface a particularly 
Marxist position, but the movement towards the virtual, the movement 
towards the image, is, I think, precisely what the Internet and the 
digitization of information is composing and representing. So if we talk 
about the movement to the virtual, remember what virtual means. It 
stems in canon and administrative law from donation ‘virtualiter’ 
meaning that the origin legitimizes and permanently confers authority 
through lineage of acquisition. Generically it is also useful to recollect 
that virtual has its etymological root in vis, power, and in virtus, 
meaning angel.   
 There is an element of the angelological in the politics of 
aesthetics. There's an element of the immaterial. And at the same time 
there is the movement to what cannot be materialized directly. Rebecca 
Tushnet, our first panelist is concerned precisely with the role of the 
image. And she has a fabulous piece in Harvard Law Review on the 
image being worth 1,000 words. Her concern is with the impact of the 
image and by extension, the impact of the imaginary on the regulation 
of virtual domains. How can the image be facilitated save by other 
images? And she will explain herself. I think performance is far more 
important than designation.  
Sonia Katyal, our second panelist, is a powerhouse who, like 
Rebecca, lives in a world of the aesthetic and the mediatized in a 
fashion that I could only scarce imagine.  
So I think we'll kick off with Rebecca and then move to Sonia. 
And the format is entirely of their invention. 
 
REBECCA TUSHNET: Thank you all for coming, and I’m sorry that 
Barton Beebe couldn’t be with us. I was hoping to talk a little bit about 
what I think of as my critical scholarship and its relationship to practice, 
so I am moving a little bit backwards along the chain that makes up the 
panels today. 
 I wanted to talk first about the First Amendment and copyright. 
I’ve written about transformative fair use and the way that the concept 
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of transformativeness, which is understood as putting new meaning or 
message into an existing work, can assist in shrinking conceptions of 
fair use insofar as fair use is understood to be a kind of reflection of the 
First Amendment.1  If your paradigm of fair use in copyright is the little 
guy angrily speaking truth to power, that fits into a particular First 
Amendment narrative about the suppression of speech by a censor; but 
it doesn’t speak to many of the spaces in copyright that historically have 
been important in protecting free speech in its broadest sense, the 
freedom to make private performances, various educational copying 
freedoms, including the freedom to make multiple copies for classroom 
use and so on. 
 My argument has been that pure copying can serve First 
Amendment purposes in access. When someone is distributing copies, 
even unauthorized copies have content and they still have value to the 
recipients. Copying can also assist in self-constitution, when we define 
ourselves by what we like, as you can see anytime you go on Facebook. 
And copying can assist us in communicating important messages to 
other people. So, for example, when someone hands out the Bible, it 
would be very odd to say that they were not saying something important 
just because they didn’t write the Bible. They’re saying something 
about what they value. They’re making an argument. And they are also 
communicating the messages in the Bible. 
 I consider my work on fair use and the First Amendment critical 
because the ultimate message is that, because pure copying does serve 
free speech purposes, the conflict between copyright and the First 
Amendment can never be fully reconciled. We have a lot of theorists 
trying to tell us about how they can live in harmony and I don’t 
essentially think that’s true. 
 My work that Professor Goodrich spoke of, which is about 
copyright’s treatment of images, is similarly diagnostic rather than 
prescriptive.2  It looks at cases in which courts have confronted the 
various images and have been unable to deal with them as images. 
Trained in interpreting texts, courts tend to take various positions 
towards the image that deny its specificity. They say either “this image 
is completely transparent, we know exactly what it means, and therefore 
everyone would see it in the same way,” or they say, “well, the image is 
opaque, who knows what it means?”  It is imminent, non-
understandable, angelic perhaps. And therefore, we have to treat it as if 
it could never be interpreted. Both of those positions actually work 
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against serious interpretation of the kind that you might find, say, in a 
classroom. Sometimes copyright disputes are disputes about meaning 
and you really do need to use the tools of aesthetics to figure out what’s 
going on as well as an underlying theory of what counts, for example, as 
fair use. 
 But what I then wanted to talk about is my work as an activist 
with a group called the Organization for Transformative Works 
(“OTW”). Given what I’ve said about transformativeness and how I 
have my doubts about it, it might seem odd that I would help found a 
group called the Organization for Transformative Works. It is a group 
created to push back against the commercialization of what some people 
call user-generated content, which is to say creative works made by 
people who love existing works. What we call “fanworks” are not-for-
profit, they’re noncommercial and, in support of them, the organization 
incorporated as a nonprofit under U.S. law. 
Why did we do this very bourgeois thing?  Let me talk about some 
of the terms. First, we’re an “organization.”  We are a legal entity, 
incorporated in Delaware. This gives us a certain kind of legitimacy, but 
at the same time it does not fully recognize the incredible diversity and 
non-organized status of actual fans. We speak for fans in certain 
contexts but of course fans are everywhere. Fans are making things 
everywhere. Most people who make fanworks even in English, even in 
the United States, have never heard of us, nor should they have to in 
order for us to say that what that they do is fine, is legitimate, is not 
infringing. 
 Second, in terms of “transformative,” we adopt the legal 
language of fair use. This concept sets up the authorial claims of people 
who are making transformative works as equal or not subordinate to the 
claims of other authors. If you’re a fan and you write a new story about 
the adventures of Kirk and Spock, you are doing something that 
copyright law recognizes as worthwhile even though you’re not making 
millions of dollars off of it. 
 The third key term in the Organization for Transformative Works 
is “works.”  The organization is set up to highlight works, not workers, 
even though the conditions of production in the communities of practice 
out of which fanworks come are vital to the actual creation of fanworks. 
People don’t tend to create in a vacuum. They put it on YouTube or on 
Tumblr so they can share it with other people who might like it, too. 
 We chose “works” because the legal arguments that we make are 
framed in terms of what is produced, even though the producers are 
vital and even though we are actually in some ways more interested in 
protecting the producers than the things that they produce. But 
copyright law looks at the work, not at the producer. Moreover, the idea 
of the “work,” instead of the more specific “story” or “movie,” has 
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important consequences for how creating activity is understood as 
implicated in but also apart from the so-called ordinary operations of the 
economy. We make chairs. We make cars. We make movies. What does 
it mean to see those as related? 
“Work” in this context, I think, gives dignity to the fans who are 
making things, who are often culturally disadvantaged people who are 
regularly mocked for consuming the very things that have been 
produced so that people will like them and consume them. And of 
course consumption here means intellectual activity: watching and 
listening, thinking, creating new things in response. We are trying to 
appeal to the dignity of work, which is, I hope, not entirely lost. 
 In practice, what do we end up doing?  I’m going to call back 
now to the importance of the image. When I started writing law review 
articles, people were mainly interested in fan fiction. Is it legitimate to 
write a new Harry Potter story and post it online?  In some senses I 
consider that battle completely won. In 1994, people debated whether 
this was an infringing derivative work or not. For a variety of reasons, 
some which Tim Wu talks about as tolerated use,3 this debate is over. 
Essentially no one sends cease and desist letters over fan fiction. 
Copyright owners recognize, at the very least, that it’s not worth it to go 
after fan fiction in court. 
 The frontier is video—the moving image and music. Part of that 
is also technology based. One can scan for copies of songs and copies of 
film clips in a way that it’s very hard to scan for a story about Harry 
Potter as opposed to a book report about Harry Potter.4  Thus, the 
OTW’s legal focus is now on video. We went to the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) anti-circumvention exception hearings trying 
to get an exemption from the Librarian of Congress for circumventing 
encryption technology in order to make clips for use in remix video. 
We participated in order to explain what fans do. Fans who make 
remix video often call themselves “vidders.”  Vidders take video clips, 
usually set them to music, and tell a new story with the existing clips. 
What happened in these hearings is that we ended up having to make 
claims about authorial genius: that people who do this are just like 
authors that the Copyright Office recognized already, and should be 
given that kind of individual dignity even though they really emerge 
from a community of production which is very different than the 
concept of the isolated authorial genius. 
 An example that proved very persuasive, quite interestingly, was 
 
                                                   
3 Tim Wu, Tolerated Uses, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617 (2008). 
4 And technologies are not developed in a vacuum; copyright owners have invested in some and 
not others, even though, perhaps, an algorithm could be devised to distinguish the book report 
from the self-published sequel. 
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a vid called Closer, using the Nine Inch Nails song, set to clips from the 
original Star Trek. It went viral some years back. It tells the story: what 
if Spock had not made it to Vulcan in time for his Pon Farr and had 
instead sexually assaulted Captain Kirk?  Here’s the thing: some in the 
audience are laughing. It’s not for you, except for those of you who 
might be Star Trek fans. It actually participated in the then forty-year 
history of Pon Farr stories made by Star Trek fans, some of which 
posited very similar things. Finally we were able to tell a story in video, 
so the vidders did. Then somebody saw Closer, who was not part of the 
community, put it up on YouTube without the vidder’s consent, and it 
became a viral hit. It was not understood as participating in this fannish 
conversation, but rather as a weird artifact like the cat videos and David 
After Dentist—the YouTube flotsam that floats around.5 
 And that’s fine. Nobody’s telling you you have to interpret a 
video the way it was meant to be interpreted. But the story of the 
circulation and recirculation of Closer illustrates the struggle of 
identifying an aesthetic practice that a decision maker may not share 
and saying that the decision maker nonetheless needs to recognize the 
practice as fair use. Because of the way that the DMCA is now 
constituted, we have to come and say we are worthy. If the Copyright 
Office doesn’t understand the use, we don’t get our exemption, and then 
what we do in order to acquire the footage is illegal. 
 As a result, as a matter of strategy, we needed to identify works 
that were intelligible to outsiders and understandable as aesthetically 
and politically good. These works needed to have a well-done, legible, 
critical message even if the viewers weren’t fans, which turned out to 
require careful selection of examples. Within the OTW, we don’t 
believe that quality in that sense is important to fair use, but 
strategically we can’t get an exemption if we don’t show the Copyright 
Office exemplars that they understand as transmitting a critical 
message. 
 Then we faced a second barrier, which is technical quality. The 
way the law is set up, the Copyright Office takes the position that you 
need to show that you have a technical need for footage of the quality 
that you can get by ripping a DVD instead of just using, say, filming the 
screen with your phone or using screen capture software. And you 
should be laughing at that because those methods produce terrible 
results. However, the idea that you have to show a need for technical 
quality forces us further into defending a particular aesthetic and also 
subjects us, again, to someone else’s determinations about how good 
and how nice-looking our messages need to be to deserve an exemption. 
 
                                                   
5 See Henry Jenkins, How to Watch a Fan-vid, (Sept. 18, 2006), http://henryjenkins.org/2006/ 
09/how_to_watch_a_fanvid.html. 
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 The Copyright Office formally disavows quality judgments but 
still ends up making them and deciding that some people but not all 
people need more than screen capture to do their artistic or educational 
work. It’s a very dispiriting process, not least because we have to go 
back and do it again: in eighteen months’ time we will start over again, 
because exemptions are granted every three years and expire if not 
renewed, and the exemption process begins well in advance of the 
three-year anniversary. It’s an example of the deep capture of the 
copyright system by powerful copyright owners: they get their rights 
forever and we get them back in short periods. 
 The thing that the rulemaking really highlighted to me was the 
way in which making critical claims intelligible to policymakers is vital 
just to preserve the breathing space that we need to keep making this 
stuff. The more of these works we make, the more this kind of creativity 
is out there, the greater the chance is that the next generation will find it 
easier to understand the claims we’re making. Ideally, fannish creations 
could be seen within the law in the same way many people think about 
opera: you might not understand it, but you recognize it as a field of 
artistic endeavor deserving of its own protection. 
 
SONIA KATYAL: It's a great pleasure to be here. I'm so happy to be 
sharing this panel with two people whose work I've really admired. And 
I also just want to start off by congratulating The Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment Law Journal on coming up with such a pressing and 
prescient topic, I think, on the intersection of CLS and intellectual 
property. 
 For myself, I did not plan to devote my life to intellectual 
property. I actually went to law school to be a civil rights lawyer and 
learned a lot about CLS along the way. Along the way, I realized that 
many of the same concerns that we focus on in the civil rights 
movement were, at the time, reemerging in the digital context. 
 Questions about equality, access, the balance between freedom of 
speech and proprietary rights, issues about privacy, issues about the 
distributive effects of entitlements on minorities, all of those kinds of 
themes, I think, were themes that also in some ways, animated some of 
the early work on crucial legal studies. So it's been fascinating for me to 
see them reified in the digital context today. 
 I want to actually spend my time focusing on a couple of these 
moments in sort of intellectual property scholarship and discuss how 
some of those contemporary issues, I think, demonstrate some 
resonance with some of the CLS movements of yesteryear. 
 In addition, I also think that the relationship between the IP 
scholarship and CLS is really quite indirect, and that's particularly what 
makes it so interesting and worthy of deeper exploration. It's because 
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there is not a clear, direct intersection between the two fields. One 
focuses on theory, the other encompasses practice. But CLS, I think, 
indirectly offers IP scholars a solid and yet nuanced framework from 
which to excavate areas that might benefit from further study. It's an 
indirect connection, a kind of parallel layering of theory and practice 
that offers significant insights for both lawyers and scholars. 
 So the first area of resonance that I see is a kind of a structural 
critique of our intellectual property system that is really deeply 
informed by CLS principles. So the original framework of copyright 
law comes from Article I, Section 8 and it's this idea of an exchange: to 
promote the progress of social welfare, the law provides an exclusive 
right to authors and investors for a limited period of time.6 
 The conflict between a  private right and public welfare is one of 
the key sorts of questions, obviously, that frames much of our work on 
intellectual property scholarship. But it also raises, I think, a really 
interesting fundamental question about whether property rights always 
promote the public good. And in the age of copyright overbreadth, it 
actually becomes hard to see how extending copyright outwards and 
further and investing it with a broader level of protection actually 
promotes social welfare. 
 I would argue that the issue of how scholars have constructed a 
notion of public progress and social welfare is deeply entrenched with 
CLS notions about providing alternative understandings beyond 
economic efficiency. So when intellectual property scholars approach 
the study of expression, as a value in and of itself, or address the 
concept of freedom as a value in and of itself, these are themes that are 
deeply, deeply intertwined with traditional CLS scholarship. 
 Many of us who are influenced by CLS, for example, tend to 
conceive of copyright as a system of social relationships and dynamic 
entitlements that are really about allowing access to others instead of a 
pure right of exclusion. This way of reconceiving the notion of public 
progress has really been influenced by the structural critiques that were 
offered by Lawrence Lessig, Siva Vaidhyanathan, and Jessica Litman, 
who gave birth to a critical information studies movement that was 
really focused on critiquing the structural relationship between broad 
flows of information and the danger of overbroad property rights.7 
 
                                                   
6
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
7
 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999); Lawrence Lessig, 
Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity (2004); Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: 
The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (1st ed. 2001); Jessica Litman, Digital 
Copyright: Protecting Intellectual Property on the Internet (2001); Siva Vaidhyanathan, 
Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity 
(2001); Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Anarchist in the Library: How the Clash between Freedom and 
Control Is Hacking the Real World and Crashing the System (2004); Lawrence Lessig, The Path 
of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L.J. 1743 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Innovating Copyright, 20 Cardozo 
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 A critical information studies movement, as I see it, is also 
deeply influenced by the value placed on freedom of expression and 
freedom of thought but it's also important to note that many of those 
scholars, I think, were steeped in other areas of legal scholarship before 
they came to intellectual property. So, for example, Lawrence Lessig is 
a constitutional law scholar; Siva Vaidhyanathan came from an 
information and library studies background; both of these fields were 
deeply influenced by thinking about modes of analysis and modes of 
value that were far beyond the economic efficiency model that other 
intellectual property scholars had embraced. 
 The second big development in terms of commonality that I see 
between intellectual property and critical legal studies involves the 
emergence of what we might call a cultural  critique of intellectual 
property. And so here I'm thinking about the power of the image, 
remaking the image, recoding the image, the immense power of 
subversion, of parody and satire in enabling racial and sexual minorities 
and others to recode certain established works. 
 Now it's true to say parodies are everywhere but I also think that 
there is this really interesting intersection between critical legal studies' 
focus on minority rights and distributive justice and the way in which 
fair use scholars routinely have heralded the rights of minorities and 
others to recode certain works for the purposes of critique and 
commentary.  
 For example, we have a lot of great scholarship today about rap 
music and jazz and how these areas of creativity forced us to imagine 
these worlds of creativity that existed beyond the controls of copyright 
law. And we also have some wonderful work by Rebecca Tushnet and 
others about how women and other minorities have recoded common 
texts through things like fan fiction, slash fan fiction, gender parody and 
the like.8 
 We also have this rich body of work that unpacks that romance of 
authorial control and the way in which audiences can themselves 
interpret and recode existing works.9  So many artists and activists 
today, I think, offer questions that have deep resonance to basic CLS 
questions. For example, questions like: for whom does intellectual 
property protection serve?  Who is actually being represented?  Who is 
being excluded?  And why are these individuals being excluded? These 
                                                                                                                     
Arts & Ent. L.J. 611 (2002); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 
68 Or. L. Rev. 275 (1989); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 
Or. L. Rev. 19 (1996); Jessica Litman, The Politics of Intellectual Property, 27 Cardozo Arts & 
Ent. L.J. 313 (2009); Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything and the Future of 
Copyright, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1207 (2007).  
8
 Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and A New Common Law, 17 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997); Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in 
Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 461 (2006). 
9
 Madhavi Sunder, Ip3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006). 
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are questions that are deeply embedded in a critical legal studies 
approach, as well. 
 Along these lines, the work of scholars like Ann Bartow comes to 
mind in pointing out areas of creativity, particularly areas of feminist 
creativity and criticism that are completely unrecognized by copyright 
law and asking the question of why.10  There is also very powerful work 
done by contemporary artists and activists that I think challenge the 
boundaries of trademark and copyright, and lend credence to the idea 
that at times challenging the boundaries of property and intellectual 
property law can be just as creative and just as innovative in terms of 
compelling a greater dynamic force for the public good.11 
 Through this important area of scholarship, we see how the 
critical aspects of these approaches has offered us some legal purchase 
in fair use cases. Today, as Rebecca pointed out, many of these cases 
now overwhelmingly favor the power of defendants in expressing their 
freedom of speech. So these cases, I think, do underscore the continued 
need for -- and the success-- of a critical and distributive approach to 
intellectual property. Today, some troubling older cases, like the 
Supreme Court's infamous gay Olympics case which refused to allow a 
gay organization to use the term Olympics,12 I think coexist with these 
more modern trademark cases that staunchly defend gay activists' right 
to set up domain names and websites that parody and comment upon 
people like Jerry Falwell. So you do see a really interesting shift.13 
 Today, I would argue that the defense of fair use bears an 
intimate relationship to the way in which critical legal studies focused 
its gaze on the role of entitlements for minority groups. Like critical 
race theory, a critical approach to copyright law tends to ask the 
question of how entitlements are distributed and their effect on 
disenfranchised groups, and also to employ tools like fair use to restore 
some balance between property rights and social justice.14 
 Now a third area in which CLS has deeply influenced intellectual 
property although indirectly is in the area of indigenous people's 
movements towards collective management of their tribal resources. So 
in crafting new models of governance of intellectual properties and 
traditional knowledge and coming up with new ways to “propertize” 
these resources, I would argue that tribal movements demonstrate and 
personify a more collective, group oriented approach to the 
 
                                                   
10
 Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 551 (2006). 
11
 For a discussion of some of these projects, see Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 
WASH. U.L. REV. 489 (2006). 
12
 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
13
 Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005). 
14
 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (2005).  
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management of these intangible resources.15  Here is where we see, 
again, a social relations approach to property taking hold in cases where 
strong rights of exclusion give way to a larger and more malleable focus 
on group rights and collective knowledge. 
 Now a final area in which we see CLS emerging aside from the 
structural, cultural, and collective areas that I've outlined is the 
political arena, which is something that we'll be talking about a lot 
today. I know that we have a lot of panels on this topic today but I 
would also argue here that many of the social movements that surround 
access to information and open source creativity bear very strong 
parallels to the kind of institutional critique that CLS offered us so 
many years ago. 
 Here I'm thinking of a number of articles, but one of the 
particularly great pieces from that period is Nomos and Narrative, by 
Robert Cover,16 and how that same rhetoric we also continue to see in 
so much of today's social movements surrounding intellectual property. 
As I, Eduardo Penalver, and other people have written, copyright 
activists like Downhill Battle which organized the Gray Album protest 
from a number of years ago, and other copyright activists of today, like 
the legacy of Aaron Swartz, I hope, will force a number of important 
exceptions in the law, assuring that some malleability continues to 
attach to copyright law and its enforcement.17   
 Admittedly, copyright activism hasn’t always been successful, 
but at times it has offered significant potential for reshaping a 
discussion about property rights. Emerging from these movements is 
this idea:  while the issue of civil rights surrounding race, I think, 
dominated the 1960's, today what we're seeing is the emergence of this 
really vibrant social movement that has been focusing a critical gaze on 
the role of intellectual property and the need for access. As one civil 
rights activist has suggested, without access to information today, 
democracy is a myth.18  I think a lot of those themes bear great 
resonance from the work that was done in earlier generations by CLS 
scholars.  
 In sum, the role of interdeterminancy, the malleability of 
authorial control, the role of a structural, cultural, collective, political 
and institutional critique and of course the importance of activism and 
 
                                                   
15
 Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313 (2008); 
Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009).  
16
 Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
17
 Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1095 
(2007); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver and Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws: How Squatters, Pirates, 
and Protesters Improve the Law of Ownership (2010); Lawrence Lessig, Aaron's Law: Violating 
a Site's Terms of Service Should Not Land You in Jail, The Atlantic, Jan. 16, 2013.  
18
 For a discussion of Downhill Battle’s role in the “Eyes on the Screen” protest, see PROPERTY 
OUTLAWS, supra n. 17, at 7.  
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social movements—all of these elements of intellectual property 
scholarship that we're seeing today have great parallels to the work that 
was done generations ago by CLS scholars. They also show us how this 
movement, I think, does continue to sort of live on, perhaps not always 
directly, but definitely indirectly to the world of intellectual property. 
Thank you. 
 
PETER GOODRICH: A wild array of themes, and thanks very much to 
both panelists. I guess I have a variety of questions, but first I'll throw it 
open for those that burn. . . . 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: [inaudible question about “commercial” versus 
“noncommercial” uses under the fair use doctrine, and referring 
indirectly to Prince v. Cariou, a case concerning the extent to which 
new works may be considered transformative under the fair use 
doctrine] 19 
 
REBECCA TUSHNET: As far as I know, Prince v. Cariou is still awaiting 
decision by the Second Circuit.20 I recommend reading The Warhol 
Foundation’s amicus brief in that case,21 which is fantastic, because it 
shows you all these pictures of art, some of which almost anyone is 
likely to recognize, and explains the ways in which they are 
appropriative. It makes the argument that there is a particular set of 
practices in the art world that deserves respect because of the ways in 
which the community changes the meaning of the art even though in 
other circumstances that transformation might not happen. I actually 
find that an attractive view of what transformation is, as opposed to a 
view that transformation has to be something that’s intelligible to 
everyone as making a different meaning from the original. 
 Let me say something maybe that is more towards the CLS 
portion of the symposium. One of the compromises that you make when 
you decide to essentially be a liberal organization, and work within the 
system, is that we decided to focus on people who, because they’re 
doing stuff that’s noncommercial, never get representation. Their stuff 
never sells for $100,000. It doesn’t happen. Also they’re culturally 
disadvantaged because rephotographing the Marlboro Man and putting 
it inside the Met is just treated differently, or at least historically has 
been, than being a big fan of Star Trek and making Star Trek stuff. 
 Because of that, we do not try and cast commercial 
 
                                                   
19 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013). 
20 Id. The case was decided several weeks after the symposium on April 25, 2013. 
21 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc., in Support of 
Defendants-Appellants and Urging Reversal, Prince, 2013 WL 1760521, available at http:// 
www.scribd.com /doc/ 71837645/Cariou-v-Prince-Warhol-Foundation-Amicus-Brief. 
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transformative uses under the bus, but they’re not our thing. So we talk 
a lot about the ways in which the fact that you do something 
deliberately and noncommercial with no hope of making money 
indicates something about the expressive value of that particular 
conduct to you. You’re not doing it to satisfy a market, so we can be 
sure that it is intrinsically connected to something that you wish to 
communicate. That’s the importance of it being noncommercial.22  
There’s plenty of commercial fair use out there. It is something that I 
worry about, that if I spend a lot of time just saying how wonderful 
noncommercial uses are, then we’re sort of giving up ground for 
commercial fair uses. 
 
PETER GOODRICH: One feature is precisely the deficit of knowledge 
that Rebecca was talking about. The key role that scholarship can play 
in actually exposing, learning about, disseminating, and transmitting the 
basic facts that relate both technologically and empirically to what is 
happening, who is doing what to whom. The question that intrigues me, 
a slight tangent, but there is one area in which critical legal studies is 
also extraordinarily vibrant and in which it never actually faded and that 
is international law. This I will suggest is the third element, namely the 
unholy ghost in the leftist trinity that is manifest in the revival of 
critique in law, the resurgence of political activism, and this in a domain 
where disparities of power, knowledge gaps, and opportunities for 
overreaching and aggression are evident and as great if not greater than 
elsewhere. 
 I wonder if the panelists would muse on the relationship between 
the impetus for critique in international law and in IP law because it 
would seem to me that there are a lot of parallels and useful 
conjunctures both in terms of disparate civil rights between nations, as 
also the status of minorities within states, and particularly the survival 
of autonomous minority groups seeking recognition. The big issue is 
assertion of identities in oppressive contexts all the way to the Arab 
Spring.  
 The other dimension is simply the evanescence, the chimera of 
boundaries past and passed. There's no longer the possibility of control. 
What intrigues me here and I think connects quite nicely, is that 
international law, in the sense of relations between states is not 
conventional law at all but rather a play of diplomacy and belligerence, 
politics and war. And there's a very strong sense at least in which 
international law has to deal with a whole series of factors that simply 
do not respond to classical legal analysis or classical legal boundaries 
 
                                                   
22 See Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J. L. 
& ARTS 497 (2008). 
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but at the same time escape any direct forms of control outside of 
punitive interventions and eventually warfare. 
 
SONIA KATYAL: I actually want to pick up on the question that was 
asked earlier about commercial versus noncommercial uses under the 
fair use doctrine. One thing that I was thinking about as you were 
speaking, and as Rebecca was responding, is how different a world we 
live in today with respect to various uses of imagery. When the early 
forms of CLS scholarship were being written, it was a lot easier to tell 
who was David and who was Goliath, right?  It was a lot easier, also, to 
delineate the boundaries between noncommercial and commercial use. 
 One of the big problems that we face today is that we have these 
structures and doctrines that suggest clear boundaries between 
commercial and noncommercial use, but the reality is that when we 
expand the boundaries of fair use, we expand them for both 
noncommercial and commercial entities, often unwittingly. 
When First Amendment rights are expanded to allow upcoming 
and lesser-known artists to use parody, the doors open for well-financed 
artists like Richard Prince23 to come along and appropriate the work of 
less well-financed artists.24  The economic disparities become even 
more apparent where the expanding power of fair use winds up having 
distributive consequences that benefit some artists and leave others 
disadvantaged.25 
 I also think that our world is very different today than in an 
earlier generation. We often characterized artists and the production of 
art as being situated, to a varying extent, outside of the capitalist 
“system” of our political economy, but today, art production is very 
much within our commercial, profit-motivated system, now more than 
ever. So it's very difficult for us to tell when things are commercial and 
when things are not commercial. That creates a lot of interesting 
questions for how we might approach the boundaries of fair use going 
forward. 
 Finally, in picking up on the international point that was raised 
earlier, a significant parallel that I see between IP and CLS involves the 
unmaking of, or recoding or subverting, of the idea of sovereignty. CLS 
offered us a significant degree of utility in terms of piercing the 
sovereignty of a work, and saying that authorial control is 
indeterminate, and, relatedly, that there's immense power of the 
audience and various third parties to reinterpret and recode. 
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 Richard Prince is the defendant in Cariou v. Prince, supra n. 19. 
24
 See id. 
25
 Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 
1331 (2004).
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 If we turn to the international realm, we observe a very similar 
thing unfolding—the Arab Spring, and even to some extent here, when 
we think about the Occupy Wall Street movement—there is this 
piercing of sovereignty of both private and public sectors in the sense 
that dominant political narratives are more fluid and are more 
susceptible to reinterpretation—opening up opportunities for third 
parties to engage in a deeper contemplation of the function, limits and 
possibilities of sovereignty.  
 
REBECCA TUSHNET: I want to take that in a different direction, which is 
that power flows. I just heard Bruce Lehman a couple of weeks ago 
explain how they’ve gone to the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”) in order to get an international agreement. This 
was actually the U.S. telling other countries what the U.S. wanted. The 
other countries agreed on a law for the Internet age, including the anti-
circumvention provisions. Then Lehman went back to Congress and 
said, “hey, we signed this international agreement, now you have to 
pass a law to go along with it.” 
 The fluidity and the multiplicity of structures is not a victory for 
anyone. It’s a set of new potential sources of power. People who are 
good at managing power and, in particular, people who have 
international lobbying groups, are going to be better at dealing with it 
than people who don’t. 
 Jack Lerner, who works with documentarians, said that we never 
even knew that our rights were being traded away in another country. 
Documentary filmmakers found out that the law changed, and it took a 
long while to even get a teeny little back through the DMCA exemption 
process which, not for nothing, the U.S. has not allowed other countries 
to adopt in the free trade agreements it’s made with them requiring them 
to adopt circumvention laws. 
 To the extent that CLS is about being attentive to flows of power 
and the way power can reconfigure itself in new ways, I think there are 
many lessons and we’re living through another example of what CLS 
tells us always happens. In terms of power being slippery, we are 
hearing content companies talk about streaming media as the future. 
You’ll get all your content, whatever it is; it will come to you over the 
Internet. Control is going to be moved so you as individuals will only be 
hailed as consumers of video. You’ll get it on demand and you’ll be 
encouraged to tweet about it and so on but you will not be understood 
by anyone, and hopefully not even by yourself in the view of these 
companies, as a creator or as an owner. That’s a very different way of 
thinking about yourself that I think is disempowering and needs to be 
fought back against. I don’t think that control will be perfect because I 
think it ignores the human tendency to make new stuff but increased 
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control is definitely part of the vision. 
 One thing that I thought of when I was listening to Sonia is a 
question that I vividly remember from the Copyright Office panel at the 
2009 DMCA hearings, which was: “you’ve brought us all these 
examples of works that are critical of the gender dynamics of an 
existing work or the racial dynamics. Could we just give an exception 
for women and racial minorities?  Would that be okay?” 
 Of course the answer is no, you can’t, but the point of the 
strategy in some ways was to put these various liberal commitments, 
and I mean liberal not in the sense of Democratic versus Republican, 
but political, liberal commitments into tension. The idea of authorial 
freedom and freedom to criticize had to be invoked against the idea of 
property as control. We successfully did that, but only by invoking one 
half of that narrative. 
 
SONIA KATYAL: I would argue that the author is part of the public 
interest. I think that obviously authorial control is such an important 
part of why we have our copyright system to begin with, but I also think 
that fair use is also an important part of this system as well. To the 
extent that we think about the balance between the two, or striking the 
right balance, it has to be in favor of this notion that if we really want to 
incentivize people to create new works, we have to allow for some 
capacity for appropriation. I don't think this observation works perfectly 
all the time, and I definitely think that the boundaries of commercial and 
noncommercial use are very fuzzy and often result in significant 
confusion. 
 However, I would emphasize that copyright law cannot be 
successful entirely by thinking only about authorial control, that our 
system of fair use is dependent on creating some area of malleability 
between these areas. When we think about the standards for preliminary 
injunctions, there is a real space for thinking more aggressively about 
importing constitutional legal principles into our interpretation of 
intellectual property. There's been some really powerful writing on the 
First Amendment concerns about preliminary injunctions.26  I think the 
Supreme Court has also weighed in on this debate periodically.27  But I 
think that there is more space for more discussion and certainly 
something that I think is really notable about the world of intellectual 
property scholarship that we live in is that so many of us arrive at the 
world of intellectual property through lots of different passions that we 
may have. So I have this great love of contemporary art, which is why I 
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 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
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 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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love writing about intellectual property. I would venture to say that 
maybe Rebecca's might be fan fiction [laughing] and Peter's obviously 
is literature. I think that we all come at it from different angles and I 
think that's part of really why scholarship is so vibrant in that way. 
 
REBECCA TUSHNET: Can I pick up on that?  In law school we learned 
about the farmer and the railroad. The railroad creates the sparks. The 
grain catches on fire. Whose fault is that?  And we are taught very 
carefully that we need to go beyond our intuitions and see that causally 
they are both responsible; that there would be no fire, no harm, without 
the presence of both the farmer and the railroad. 
 What’s interesting about claims like the Maria Pallante’s is that 
they forget that insight very strategically with respect to the author and 
the audience. That work is not valuable in the Marianas Trench; a work 
is valuable to the extent that it is doing things for an audience. That 
doesn’t mean that the legal allocation of control or payment or anything 
has a natural ordering. It is actually one of choice, but that’s what we 
were supposed to learn from the railroad and the farmer. It’s interesting 
that copyright tries very hard to make us forget that. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: A question for each of the panelists, who all seem 
to have a unique relationship to the history and evolution of CLS in 
legal academia. Would you agree with the basic premise of this 
symposium, which is that CLS has either survived, or made a 
resurgence of sorts in the context of IP scholarship, more so than other 
legal sub-disciplines? And from a more personal point of view, I was 
hoping you could each comment on your experience and understanding 
of CLS in legal academia past and present, and perhaps, Professor 
Tushnet, if you could specifically comment on how and whether your 
father, Mark Tushnet, a founder of the CLS movement, has influenced 
your scholarship? 
 
PETER GOODRICH:  Fantastic question and we'll answer in order of age 
which means not me first. Either of you two. 
 
REBECCA TUSHNET: I would just say my father has the incredible 
ability to give just the right amount of advice: neither too much nor too 
little. I’ve read his work. He’s given me very nice comments on mine. I 
don’t know that I could trace any particular kind of influence from CLS 
other than that people did tend to ask me, especially with the copyright 
and First Amendment piece, “so what do you want us to do?”  I actually 
felt like I didn’t need to have any answer to that to have a good 
argument. Part of the project of critical legal studies is to say, look, I’ve 
identified this problem; this problem will persist no matter what 
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structure you set up, and that’s why you have to make political choices 
about it rather than saying that there is a legal answer. I think my work 
actually does fit in that tradition that you’re going to have to make a 
political choice. 
 I didn’t perceive political problems with that although that also, I 
think, has to do with the changing nature of the academy compared to 
the 1980’s. 
 
SONIA KATYAL: A lot of my work is (in some ways) considered to be 
resonant of a tradition of CLS, even though I don't directly reference the 
foundational works of that movement as much as I probably should. But 
I will say that one of the things that I think is really special and 
wonderful about the world of intellectual property scholars that we have 
is that I think so many of us actually have our own sort of critical edge 
in our own way and I think the world of intellectual property 
scholarship has been really deeply influenced by, I think, the senior 
scholars in the field like Jessica Litman, Siva Vaidhyanathan, Larry 
Lessig and others, Pam Samuelson comes to mind. All of these are 
people who were very deeply committed to thinking about equality and 
thinking about minorities and thinking about freedom and also really 
actively thinking about mentoring. I think that in many ways our 
scholarship developed because we had senior legal scholars who were 
incredibly generous to us and it led us to create works that were 
generatively linked to the works of those prior scholars. 
 Intellectual property is different from many other fiends in the 
sense that it is a young, vibrant field and I think that the senior scholars 
in those fields, Mark Lemley particularly, took it upon themselves to be 
very, very actively supportive of junior scholars. So I didn't really worry 
so much about the politics of tenure or the politics of my writing 
because I knew that most of the intellectual property scholars that I was 
in dialog with were deeply supportive of the values that I held, even if 
we had different methodologies. 
 I went to the University of Chicago Law School, and I also went 
to Brown University for my undergrad work, so I had sort of a varied 
educational experience. In many ways it was really helpful for me to 
learn a totally different methodology of thinking and to understand that 
fairness is one value, and efficiency is another, and to think in terms of 
externalities and the Coase theorem was actually a really useful thing to 
study and to reflect upon. 
 Anyway, in many ways the field of intellectual property is, I 
think, vibrantly reflective of the leadership of intellectual property 
scholars who have been really committed to many similar ideals that 
engaged critical legal studies, in addition to projects devoted to 
rethinking social welfare and efficiency.  
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: [inaudible question concerning the application of 
fair use principles to trademark law] 
 
REBECCA TUSHNET: Deven Desai has this interesting paper, which I’m 
not entirely convinced by, making precisely that move with respect to 
trademark.28  I think the argument does have a lot of logical force. Now 
here’s the question. CLS teaches us that logic doesn’t always get the job 
done when some other commitment is actually driving the result. Look 
at Eldred and Golan. Under real First Amendment doctrine, Eldred and 
Golan are travesties. And the Court just says, “no, sorry, no First 
Amendment for you. Fair use and idea/expression are the only First 
Amendment constraints on copyright. We didn’t mean what we said 
about the traditional contours of copyright as constraints. It doesn’t 
matter that copyright looks nothing like it did when the Framers put the 
First Amendment together.”  The reason that I distrust this type of 
argument based on extending the logic of Citizens United and similar 
cases to expressive uses is that I don’t believe that, when it comes down 
to it, courts are going to be willing to follow the logic. They’re going to 
say, “no, but trademark,” in the same way that it happened in Eldred 
and Golan. 
 I think we lose more than we gain in adopting that argument. 
However, it is completely logical. It’s not that it doesn’t make sense. 
You might get some victories from it, but I don’t think that the game is 
going to end up being worth the candle there. 
 
PETER GOODRICH: I was going to say a very great deal in response to 
the audience member’s question concerning the evolution and 
resurgence of CLS in legal academia, but time has passed on. I think it's 
important that we move on, so just very briefly, I think Rebecca 
mentioned Foucault, in the sense that power generates resistance. I think 
that there is a reversal of that flow which is captured surprisingly and 
not badly by Rebecca's father who said that CLS was really about 
finding a place within the legal academy for a particular leftist position 
and so was expressive of the concerns and rights of the legal academics 
and activist lawyers of the time.  
 I think a new generation seeks novelty as well, but this is more of 
purpose than of place, of use rather than possession. The expectation of 
institutions as habitus and community has dissipated somewhat, and it is 
project rather than position that is the ground of renewal. It is a shift 
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from class struggle, the fundamental contradiction, which is a spatially 
and structurally defined dialectic, to the virtual apprehension, the play, 
the use, the uselessness  of images. This is the struggle for the 
imaginary constitution of society, as Castiodoris put it all those years 
ago, a struggle prefigured in but hardly exhausted by the culture wars in 
which CLS participated. So I will end with a parable of sorts from my 
own experience. It is one that nicely takes me back to one of our starting 
points, the role of Derrida in CLS, and of law in his philological and 
literary politics. Back in 1987 I was in Eastern Europe, behind the Iron 
Curtain, in Russian occupied Budapest. I had been invited to lecture but 
when the Marxist professoriate of Etvos Lorand University Law School 
met me and discussed my planned lecture, they rapidly realized that this 
was not a good idea and cancelled the class. Sensible folks. I had a day 
free and decided to travel to Sopron, a city on the border with Austria 
where my host had a sister willing to show me round. I took the train 
and a copy of Jacques Derrida, The Postcard, as my reading. It did not 
occur to me that I needed a passport to travel inside the country but 
close to Sopron the police entered the train and asked for ID. My only 
document was The Postcard, which they scrutinized, discussed and then 
shaking their heads indicated that it was not enough and arrested me for 
a while until my host came and vouched for me. When I was next on a 
panel with Derrida, I told him the story. He paused and pondered for a 
moment and then said “I am sorry that my book was of no help.” And of 
course it was useless, but in the best of senses. It gave no comfort to the 
authorities. It provided no identification of me. It made no demand. And 
yet I read it on the train, I read it in the police cell. I finished it on my 
return. Socrates and Freud were comfortingly to hand. At random, 
though I am fond of quoting it: “In history, this is my hypothesis, 
epistolary fictions multiply with each new crisis of destination.” And as 
for me, I'm delighted to reminisce, to join Jacques, to do something 
completely useless, and so with that in mind, I bid you farewell and we 
move on to the next panel. 
 
  
Transcripts Galley 7.12 _ FINAL (Do Not Delete) 7/12/2013  5:31 PM 
624 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 31:597 
PANEL II: CRITICAL LEGAL ACTIVISM AND 
NETROOTS MOVEMENTS  
VICTORIA SMITH EKSTRAND*  
BRETT FRISCHMANN*  
JOHN TEHRANIAN*  
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN*  
 
BRETT FRISCHMANN: Thank you for being here today and thank you to 
Sarah, Eric and all the AELJ members for their hard work in putting the 
conference together, and especially to Agatha for having such a vision 
to bring these three different panels together and all of these great 
scholars together. I think the vision is really quite amazing. 
 We are going to pick up where we left off with the last panel and 
continue an excellent discussion. The theme here for this panel is 
“Critical Legal Activism and Netroots Movements.”  In a sense the 
panel is going to serve as a bridge between the first and third panels 
with the first panel that's focused on critical legal studies and IP and the 
third panel with its focus on the role of the public in IP and Information 
Law policymaking.  
 We have three outstanding scholars whom I will only introduce 
very briefly. I want to begin with Victoria Ekstrand, from UNC's School 
of Journalism and Mass Communication. She specializes in media law 
and First Amendment issues. We are using Victoria’s Article, Birthing 
“CLA”: Critical Legal Activism, the IP Wars and Forking the Law, as a 
springboard for our discussion so we're going to hear from her first.29 
 Then next we'll have the pleasure of hearing reflections from 
Siva Vaidhyanathan, the Robertson Professor of Media Studies and the 
Chair of the Department of Media Studies at the University of Virginia. 
Siva is a cultural historian and media scholar. He is a prolific and very 
influential author, and has even been on The Daily Show with Jon 
Stewart! Finally we will have the pleasure of hearing from John 
Tehranian, the Irwin R. Buchalter Professor of Law at Southwestern 
Law School. John is a very experienced IP and Entertainment Law 
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litigator. He is also a prodigious scholar, and his recent Article, 
Towards A Critical IP Theory: Copyright, Consecration, and Control 
influenced the organizers of this symposium.30 
 
VICTORIA EKSTRAND: I know the first panel went into some of the 
history of CLS but to talk about what we mean by critical legal activism 
I think it's worth reviewing some common themes of first wave CLS if 
we can call it that. 
 First, CLS, in its initial incarnations, talked about rights 
demonstrated the law’s indeterminacy and showed how the same law 
often yielded different results. Secondly, CLS was interested in 
interdisciplinary analyses that revealed how the laws' effects were 
varied and inconsistent. Third, CLS exposed how the legal system 
created its own realm of insiders, effectively blocking participation 
from untrained legal actors. And finally CLS showed just how 
impenetrable the law could be. CLS argues for social visions and reform 
that the law often seemed to block. 
 We would argue that CLS scholars were very good at exposing 
the laws' indeterminacy in their work and the value of interdisciplinary 
scholarship in looking at the effects of law and policy, how it was that 
law actually worked on the ground. Where they struggled more was in 
effecting actually change. 
 In other words, if CLS 1.0 was a movement, it was a movement 
mostly on paper. It was a response to what the 1960's were about but it 
did not really carry forth a lot of these visions into practice. There are a 
numbers of reasons for that, some which we've heard about and some of 
which our paper gets into and we can talk more about that later if you 
want. 
 Our primary argument in these two papers is that the intellectual 
property wars have been a privileged location to help realize some of 
the goals of first wave CLS. CLS did not cause a realization of those 
goals but those goals have nonetheless been realized to some extent in 
the last decade or so by engagement in these disputes. We began to talk 
about how that happened. Who's made that happen? 
 The reaction and responses to the IP wars have come from a 
number of different locations and actors, all people affected in one way 
or another by increasingly overprotective IP policies. The discussion 
has engaged academics, students, lawmakers, industry hackers, artists, 
musicians, even my mother, every time she asks for a photo of my 
daughter and she wants to do something fun with it. That has made it a 
unique location for discussion about legal reform. 
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 Academics have been talking forever about the problems with the 
fair use doctrine and the sometimes arbitrary and subjective way fair use 
is applied. If you work in IP or have any relationship to these issues 
you're constantly bombarded with questions about fair use.  
 Academics, outside the law schools, are also greatly involved in 
this discussion. Both papers we've written talk about the unique role 
people like Richard Stallman have played in taking action and inspiring 
others to take action. Scholars like Siva and Gabriella Coleman more 
recently and others have set the stage for thinking about copyright in 
particular as a historical and current power struggle. 
 My UNC colleague, Paul Jones in the School of Information and 
Library Science was among the first to set up one of the first free and 
largest open source databases online. So IP was and remains a very 
interdisciplinary exercise. 
 Programmers, academics, and legal professionals have set up 
new systems and new organizations to make IP law and policy more 
accessible to people like my mom and others: Creative Commons; the 
work of EFF and Public Knowledge, these are all efforts that, in 
Christine Harold's terms, intensify. Are they perfect solutions to all the 
problems we face in IP law?  No, but they are, we argue, real efforts 
towards reform. 
 Finally the activists' efforts of the past year which the next panel 
is going to get into, the blackouts and so on about PIPA, the pushback 
against the Research Works Act, the new pushback against the revised 
CFAA, these are all responses that demonstrate some promise of 
reform, we argue, some promise of moving vision into action. Again the 
realization of these last two objectives of CLS here are what we're 
terming critical legal activism and in Harold's terms a kind of resistance 
in which untrained legal minds, actors, critically employ the controlling 
structures of society rather than simply fighting against them. 
 Critical legal activism lives in what Dave Karpf might call the 
organizing layer of collective action. This is a relatively new space in 
collection action theory. It's what the Internet has obviously enabled us 
to do, to organize on it, to use it, to think about, debate, and influence 
policy. Karpf might say the work of IP activists in the last decade or so 
has been an NMAO, a non-membership advocacy organization. 
 That's less a group and more a kind of a loosely organized 
coalition of netroot activists who petition, but more importantly, are 
creating these online tools for collective action. Some of these tools 
look like “clicktivism,” you might argue, and I think that is a valid 
critique.  
By contrast, some of these tools seem to have a greater potentional 
impact. “Fork the Law,” for example, is a group of hackers and law 
students based in Silicon Valley, who are working to reform the 
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Our second paper goes into more detail 
about this group, which is building Internet tools that allow for more 
direct commentary from citizens on law and proposed legislation. Along 
the same lines, Representative Lofgren recently solicited comments 
from various groups interested in reforming the CFAA on Reddit after 
the suicide of Aaron Swartz' suicide. Fork the Law is actively recruiting 
hackers write code to enable this idea of an open source, citizens’ 
legislative markup.  
 What fuels critical legal activism, if we're going to call it that?  
The papers don't address this directly but our discussions have led me to 
think about what's behind the shift, and I think there are a few possible 
answers. 
 First, I think the subject matter here, intellectual property, is a 
factor. Everyone is touched in some way by intellectual property in 
either their professional or personal lives. It has ubiquity.  
 Second, speaking as a former journalist and somebody who 
worked at the Associated Press for ten years, I think a really compelling 
narrative helps in this activism. Part of what happened in the SOPA and 
PIPPA debate was this story about Wikipedia being down in the black 
and a bunch of hackers jamming the phones of US Congress. This 
makes for a good story. Similarly Aaron Swartz' suicide this year has 
been another compelling heart wrenching story and those narratives 
have helped to fuel this type of activism. 
 Third, is this interdisciplinary collaboration and cooperation, 
even here at this conference. IP law and policy requires cross-
collaboration among and across layers of knowledge, skill, and social 
power. Professor Litman's work has talked about this and the 
importance of engaging all these different people in the discussion. 
Dave Karpf's work is also really instructive here. We have this new 
layer online to create and coordinate the effort and talk about our rights 
and the law. These tools are not going to save democracy and reform 
every bad law. They're not going to turn us all into lawyers. Let's hope 
not. But they invite a new level of participation. And Karpf has 
convincingly argued, in my view, that this is happening. I like to think 
that is a promising step towards reforming much of what's wrong or 
problematic with IP policy today. 
 Finally, CLS struggles because of internal disagreement within 
law schools about the role of the critical theory in legal academia. It is 
often said that law professors associated with CLS have been or will be 
denied tenure because of it, and the label has become quite suspect. As a 
result, fewer law professors identify themselves as “crit” scholars, 
despite the fact that many law students came to law school, and still 
come to law school, looking to delve into critical scholarship, or make 
the kind of change we're talking about. All of this, I think, raises 
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questions about the role of legal education.  
 
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN: Hi, thank you for staying to listen to me, and 
thank you for staying to listen to Victoria discuss her paper. It’s very 
provocative, and it sparks a lot of great thought. It started a wonderful, 
but all too brief, phone conversation among all of us the other day. 
 I also want to thank you for just being you, for being Cardozo. 
This is an amazing place. I spent nearly eight years just down the 
avenue at NYU, the other school in Manhattan. But, this particular 
school always had its doors open to me. 
And there were so many wonderful events in my time that I spent 
in law school—great symposia, great guest speakers. I always seemed 
to be on the right email lists. The faculty and students here were very 
welcoming, so I felt like this was a second home when I lived in 
Manhattan, much more than that other law school down the avenue. 
 But I want to talk about Tori’s paper because it’s an exciting 
confluence of ideas. It has revived a thought I have had for some time. 
We are going to have to get our minds around the intellectual history of 
the free culture movement, or whatever term you want to put to this 
notion of information policy activism, copyright activism, et cetera. 
 Now, if and when we actually take the intellectual history very 
seriously, Tori’s contribution will be a central part and chapter of it. It’s 
not the whole story, of course. The story is of how a ragtag group of 
copyright scholars in the academy in the early 1990s started noticing 
opportunities, changes, threats, and they happened to get together, in 
many cases with librarians who were noticing the same things and a few 
other disparate intellectuals, and raised early warnings about some 
rather scary proposals in Congress that ultimately became law by 1998. 
 You can’t necessarily draw a direct lineage between critical legal 
studies (“CLS”) and all that happened, the free culture movement; but 
as Victoria explains, because the legal academy itself was altered by the 
presence and the experience, the often painful experience of CLS, you 
can’t help but pay attention to its influence in general. It’s the extent to 
which CLS changed the game, changed the “habitus” of the legal 
academy. 
 So that means there’s actually this whole fascinating story of the 
rise and fall of CLS, which has been told in various forms, and in 
various ways, but I think there’s probably a much bigger and richer 
analysis yet to be told. 
 If I were to give direct advice to Victoria on how to expand and 
deepen the paper, I would suggest that she run with one particular set of 
scholars and talk about their influence. It’s too easy to trace this free 
culture movement to the writing of Larry Lessig and Jamey Boyle, two 
people that I love dearly and certainly in many ways are the loudest and 
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proudest among us. But in terms of who they’re footnoting, who they’re 
reading, who the rest of us are footnoting and reading, there’s such a 
fascinating set of concerns and issues rolling through the legal 
scholarship that don’t always make it onto Larry’s presentations but 
nonetheless affected how all of us think and discuss this. 
 I’m referring to the work of Pam Samuelson and Jessica Litman 
in the 1990s, and far beyond of course, right up through Julie Cohen’s 
work, which I think really exemplifies a lot of the powerful critiques 
offered by CLS, as we heard earlier from Sonia, and the work of Ann 
Bartow and her very explicit feminist analysis of copyright and many 
other issues that is essential to this. You could actually take a cast of 
characters like Pam Samuelson and Jessica Litman, Julie Cohen, Ann 
Bartow, Rebecca Tushnet, Sonia Katyal and tell an amazing story of the 
conversation among these scholars and their influence on other scholars. 
What you’re seeing here is a feminist and/or subaltern influence on a 
dominant set of ideas within the legal academy to the point where these 
scholars, all of them, started their careers at different points, have had 
remarkable influence on the rest of us. 
 And therefore they have had remarkable influence on public 
policy. If you have just started to get interested in digital copyright, and 
you started Googling for “digital copyright,” chances are you’re going 
to find Jessica Litman’s book because it’s called Digital Copyright. So 
what a great thing and what a great primer and what a great introduction 
to those issues and it’s free, which is the whole point of this, right? 
 One of the things that I think could be fruitful in the paper is a 
deeper analysis of the battles in the 1970s and 1980s between CLS and 
law and economics. Because so much of what was changing in the legal 
academy in the 1970s and 1980s and changing in jurisprudence was the 
profound influence of law and economics: Robert Bork’s book on 
antitrust, Richard Posner’s early work, et cetera. This stuff was rocking 
the right and having a tremendous influence on the left and of course 
having a tremendous and immediate influence on regulatory policy in 
the Reagan Administration. In the wake of law and economics, CLS 
was trying to say, “wait, the story’s not that simple.” 
 The last thing you want to do is simplify all of these complex 
stories of power and human relations. What you have is CLS working in 
direct response to and opposition to law and economics. You also have 
it trying to displace, in a lot of ways, a more established liberal rights 
framework—a Dworkin-Rawls framework, for instance. So CLS was 
playing this fascinating role in the 1970s and 1980s. That complicates 
the relationship between CLS and the free culture movement because 
law and economics turns out not to have a definite and clear set of 
answers about what sort of copyright policy we should have. It actually 
yields a fascinating and complicated set of answers to the point where, 
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for instance, libertarians like Alex Kozinski or originators of the law on 
economics like Richard Posner, can at various times in their career be 
the most vocal and fervent advocates of looser intellectual property 
rather than stronger—although not always in Posner’s case. 
 Okay. Here’s a caveat in this whole story. It comes to the 
activism part. That intellectual property law is politically contested and 
that it’s politically contested by multiple stakeholders does not 
necessarily mean that there’s a direct link to CLS. Many areas of the 
law are politically contested by multiple stakeholders. Lots of areas of 
the law are subject to political sway and movement. You can look at the 
gun rights movement and gun rights policy as a similar phenomenon. So 
there are multiple stakeholders active in various ways, nongovernmental 
organizations, dispersed groups active on both sides of these issues, on 
multiple sides of these issues. So it doesn’t necessarily follow that just 
because there is activism there’s a CLS influence. However, I think if 
you trace it intellectually, there’s something to go on here. 
 So it’s not just the CLS loosened up the legal academy in the 
1970s and 1980s, although it certainly did, to the point where, as Tori’s 
paper discussed and as we heard in the first panel, CLS has left us all 
with the ability to ask questions in different ways that we might not 
have asked in 1970 or 1971 and maybe even yielded different answers. 
The spirit of CLS has certainly been taken up by all sorts of people in 
the academy, whether they know it not or whether they cop to it or not. 
But, it’s not just that. Cultural studies and cultural theory has loosened 
up U.S. intellectual and academic life. 
 It’s done it in a similar way, in a sense that at its high point of 
visibility in the late 1980s, early 1990s, it was the object of intense 
derision. By this I mean left wing cultural theory. And it was quashed in 
the sense that it is no longer “the thing.”  To traffic in these ideas, to 
write dissertations quoting Deleuze and Guattari throughout, is not 
necessarily an avenue to a good job and tenure anymore. However, the 
influence of Roland Barthes, Michelle Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari and 
the Frankfurt School are so embedded in the habitus—in the common 
sense of the cultural academy and therefore the classroom and so many 
people who receive an undergraduate education at America’s leading 
universities—that of course it’s playing a role in the lens we use to 
examine the world. 
 So, it should not be a surprise that when young people who have 
gone through the elite universities of the United States enter the elite 
law schools of the United States and then enter the legal academy, they 
are carrying through some of these habits of thought, and perhaps 
standpoints or perceptions. That doesn’t mean that those habits are 
dominant. It doesn’t mean that those habits always yield the same 
simplistic answers, which is always a danger in any ideological shift, 
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but it is part of the milieu of ways that it certainly was not before the 
1970s. 
 It is also important to remember the relationship between CLS 
and legal realism. Remember, in American life pragmatism never went 
away, and so legal realism, while out of fashion after World War II for a 
variety of reasons and the rise of rights-based liberalism pushed it away, 
was never out of the political and intellectual life of the United States. 
So there always was an opening for it. 
 Now we are at the time when Victoria makes the point that CLS 
has had such a profound influence on the legal academy that it’s been 
absorbed without being identified. Nothing strikes me as better evidence 
of this than, just last week, in the oral arguments in U.S. v. Windsor (the 
Defense of Marriage Act case) when Justices Scalia and Alito both 
hinted that they could not traffic in the rights-based analysis because the 
rights-based analysis would not go their way. 
 They can’t play, and you can’t play around with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, anyway. They can’t do a textual reading of this case 
because there’s no text to read. So in fact you have Scalia asserting that 
sociologists disagree about the effect of gay marriage on children, 
which is not true but it’s something he wants to believe very much. 
 And you have Justice Alito saying that we’re asked to judge a 
very recent thing here, you know, how long has there been gay 
marriage?—as if his job is to make a policy decision. It’s striking that 
these are the two justices essentially asking sociological questions 
poorly, without real information. Nonetheless, they are—it’s as if they 
want Gunner Myrdal to show up and write a brief for them all of a 
sudden. So this is just how much this habit of thought has actually 
affected legal thinking. 
 Ultimately, how much has legal realism and CLS affected legal 
thinking?  I would assert that those of us living in this country in the 
wake of Bush v. Gore have a real hard time believing that the law is the 
law is the law. Thank you very much. 
 
JOHN TEHRANIAN: I want to thank the organizers for putting together 
this great conference and I would like to echo both Siva and Sonia’s 
sentiments that this is a prescient topic. This invitation came at a 
particularly timely juncture, not just because of the ubiquitous headlines 
about the Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) and the Protect IP Act 
(“PIPA”) last year and the Aaron Swartz tragedy this year, but with 
respect to my own scholarship. I recently published an Article that 
touches on the specific themes of this symposium, so I’m appreciative 
of this invitation and the opportunity to meet with some great scholars 
in this field and talk about these issues. 
 I first suspected that the IP world had permanently changed a 
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couple of Thanksgivings ago—specifically, the Thanksgiving of 2011. I 
was seated around my dining table, having a classic turkey dinner with a 
group of relatives, including one of my younger cousins. He’s about 
sixteen years old and, like most teenagers, he’s never paying attention to 
any of the boring things that the adults are talking about. Instead, he’s 
usually texting or tweeting with friends on his iPhone. So he’s sitting 
around, tinkering, per usual, on his iPhone—this time listening to some 
music on it—when, all of a sudden, he looks over to me and says, “Hey 
John, I’ve got a question for you.” 
 Startled at his sudden attention, I look over to him and reply, 
“Yeah, what is it?”  And he responds with the following line: “So, you 
know, what’s up with SOPA? What do you think?”  A bit stunned, I 
look at him and think to myself that there’s no way he’s asking me 
about the SOPA. Remember, this was before all of the coordinated 
protests and the most vocal activity against the legislation. I just figure 
he must be referring to a new band I’m not familiar with. In a 
(misguided) effort to maintain my “indie cred,” I tell him that I haven’t 
heard of them but am eager to learn more: “So who do they sound 
like?” I ask. My cousin drops his phone on the table and retorts, “You 
haven’t heard of SOPA, John?  I thought you were an intellectual 
property expert. You are a law professor, right?” 
Rattled and looking to reestablish my bona fides, I mutter, “Oh, of 
course, you mean SOPA, the Stop Online Piracy Act . . . what do you 
know about that?” And he just shakes his head and then starts telling me 
all about SOPA and how he and his friends are outraged. All the while, 
I’m still thinking about how a sixteen-year-old kid could be following 
bills pending before Congress. And at that moment, it occurred to me: 
we are in the midst of a sea change. So it wasn’t too surprising when, in 
January, there was the famous blackout where Wikipedia, Google and 
others gave unprecedented attention to the arguments against SOPA and 
PIPA and secured the demise of the legislation. 
 Of course, the incredible netroots/grassroots resistance to SOPA 
and PIPA played a critical role in the bills’ swift defeat. But there will 
be more SOPA’s and PIPA’s down the line. Still, it was a remarkable 
moment, as evidenced by that dinner table conversation where I put my 
foot in my mouth and forever called my credibility into question in front 
of my young cousin. 
 The SOPA/PIPA moment demonstrated that there were serious 
changes afoot in the world of intellectual property. Now I came to this 
topic in a way that’s similar to Sonia. As she mentioned, she went to 
law school hoping to become a civil rights litigator. Although I do 
mostly intellectual property work, in another part of my academic life, I 
focus on civil rights issues and write about the social construction of 
race and the history of whiteness. My two main areas of academic focus 
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are, therefore, seemingly unrelated. Well, as you know, when you’re 
going up for tenure, you often put these packages together where you 
have to explain your research agenda and trajectory and you get 
questions from colleagues about why you pursue these two divergent 
fields and what they might have in common. 
 So, post-tenure, I really started thinking about the relationship 
between intellectual property and civil rights issues. It became clear that 
the thing that they have in common is, at least for me, a similar 
methodological approach which is very much informed by the critical 
legal studies and critical race theory movements; an approach that 
analyzes societal hierarchies and power relationships and how they can 
be either accentuated or reproduced through the use of seemingly 
neutral principles and ordering laws applied formalistically in our legal 
tradition. What I’ve effectively done—and what I think all of the 
scholars here have done—is begun to look at intellectual property 
through such a lens. 
 Of course, this is an important time in the development of 
intellectual property. Copyright is exploding in large part because 
copyright law actually means something to the average person in a way 
that it didn’t just a generation ago. It was hard to get hold of a printing 
press in the 1970’s when the last major copyright act was passed in 
1976. However, now, we all have printing presses of our own, both at 
home (by way of the networked computer) and in our pockets (by way 
of our networked smartphones). 
 Many of you are working on these “printing presses” right now. 
They allow us to make many types of uses (both authorized and 
unauthorized) of copyrighted works that were never before possible. 
Copyright law now influences our daily lives to an unprecedented 
extent. It tells us what words we can write, what movies or art we can 
watch, what tattoos we can get (think about the Mike Tyson case 
involving The Hangover sequel), what yoga sequences we can perform 
(think of Bikram claiming copyrights to yoga sequences), and even 
what kinds of worship we can engage in (think of the countless cases 
involving splinter groups and religious traditionalists fighting over 
copyright claims to books of worship). 
 So copyright law has a profound impact on the digital, networked 
lives of the twenty-first century. Of course, as I’ve argued elsewhere, 
because of the way copyright law is written, it has the possibility of 
turning us all into massive infringers. We all unwittingly infringe 
copyright law hundreds of times a day—in some ways that are quite 
harmless, and in some that are potentially more harmful. And at every 
corner, the law mediates our relationship with cultural and expressive 
content and its ability and means to do so is ripe for deconstruction. 
 I’ve looked at this issue in terms of three different moments: 
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when rights are being vested, when rights being asserted, and when 
rights being adjudicated. I’ve examined how, in those moments, our 
ostensibly neutral laws and ordering principles can actually consolidate 
and perpetuate existing power structures. 
 So to give you a small example of what I’m talking about, I’ll 
take what is, at first blush, a seemingly boring topic: the registration 
requirement of copyright law. This is something that doesn’t get a 
whole lot of academic attention; yet for anybody who actually litigates 
copyrights, this is perhaps one of the most important things to consider 
in a piece of infringement litigation. 
 As you all know, we live under a copyright regime that has 
supposedly done away with almost all formalities. That’s the rule under 
the Berne Convention, which the United States adopted in 1989. Yet in 
the United States, unlike any other major country in the world, we have 
a requirement that you must timely register your copyright in order to 
qualify for the two big prizes of copyright remedies: statutory damages 
and attorneys fees. If you don’t timely register, all you can recovery is 
actual damages as a plaintiff. Now this may seem like a relatively 
innocuous rule—just a harmless procedural formality—until you start 
doing a big-picture analysis of what this means in terms of whose 
copyrights are enforced and whose copyrights aren’t. 
 Effectively, this unique rule creates a massive rift between 
sophisticated creators and unsophisticated creators—a rift that also falls 
on socioeconomic lines, that falls on racial lines, and that can fall on 
gender lines. For the unsophisticated creators of the world (who almost 
never timely register), when their works are infringed, what can they 
do?  Almost nothing. They can try to get an injunction at the perfect 
time, but if they miss that window of opportunity, they can only recover 
actual damages and profits, which are tough to prove; they can never 
receive their attorney’s fees and they don’t qualify for statutory 
damages. In short, they cannot practically litigate their copyrights even 
though we’re told that our copyright regime lacks formality and 
copyright vests instantly at the moment of creation. 
 For sophisticated content creators, the situation is much more 
sanguine. They have the hammer of statutory damages and attorneys 
fees available, such that even a an individual act of copyright 
infringement might be worthwhile to push into court—something we’ve 
seen with the aggressive anti-p2p campaigns that resulted in huge 
judgments against the likes of administrative assistants and students for 
the unlawful sharing of files online. 
 So, for example, if you infringe the works of a Hollywood studio, 
you’re going bankrupt or even to jail. But if the studio infringes your 
work, the studio lawyers know exactly what to ask first: did you register 
your work and when?  And most often, you didn’t register your work or 
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you didn’t register it timely, in which case they can say, good luck, sue 
us, go for it: you’ll never recover enough to pay your attorney. As 
victims of infringement, sophisticated companies can pursue back-
breaking penalties against defendants; meanwhile, as alleged infringers 
themselves, sophisticated companies can often times escape with only 
de minimus liability. 
 This massive power differential, emboldened by legal formality, 
perpetuates cultural hierarchy and it’s only by looking at copyright 
through a critical lens that we can begin to appreciate this dynamic and 
its broader societal consequences. But there is hope on that front with 
the development of a popular copyright consciousness. Copyright has 
grown increasingly relevant by affecting us in myriad ways in our daily 
lives; as a result, there is a growing mainstream awareness of copyright 
law, a trend epitomized by the example I gave earlier involving my 
cousin. Consider the stark contrast between the relatively indifferent 
public response to the legislation that led to the Eldred case (the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act which passed in 1998) and the 
massive outcry against PIPA and SOPA some fifteen years later. 
 In 1998, the public knew little about the Copyright Term 
Extension Act. It was passed without much debate—just a voice vote in 
Congress—with scant public dialogue on the subject. A decade and a 
half later, it’s a different world. With the SOPA and PIPA incident, we 
just witnessed remarkable scrutiny over the minutiae of pending 
legislation before Congress by a massive number of individuals who are 
typically not politically inclined. And this leads to another interesting 
point: the critical activism that we’re now seeing in copyright appears to 
transcend traditional political divides. 
 This is a salient aspect of critical intellectual property activism 
that I think powerfully distinguishes it from its predecessor, CLS, and 
gives me some hope that it can enjoy greater achievements in the real 
world than CLS ever did. One of the charges against CLS was that it 
was primarily an ivory-tower, elite-based movement that never really 
moved that far beyond academic circles. With respect to the copyright 
activism that we’re seeing now, however, the impetus is coming not just 
from the top down but from the bottom up; and we’re witnessing 
individuals who are traditionally apolitical getting engaged. 
 It’s not just that the youth became involved in the movement 
against SOPA and PIPA; rather, as the debate over SOPA and PIPA 
demonstrated, the traditional fault lines of politics don’t necessarily 
coincide with the emerging fault lines of copyright law. For example, on 
the Supreme Court, perhaps the most ardent protector of content owners 
is someone whose views are typically associated with the progressive 
left: Justice Ginsberg. 
 Meanwhile, some of the most ardent criticisms of copyright in 
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recent years have come from the political right. An individual who’s 
going to be in the next panel, Derek Khanna, epitomizes this 
observation. Khanna is the author of the influential study from the 
Republican Study Committee last November that criticized copyright 
law by talking about its need for greater fair use protection and 
questioning its increasing duration. Khanna did so from a free-market 
perspective—a libertarian point of view—which critiqued runaway 
copyright as a form of corporate welfare and an anti-competitive, 
unnatural state-granted monopoly. 
 Now what was really interesting was that report came out on a 
Friday (I know this because I remember receiving a copy of the report 
immediately from a friend who saw that my book, Infringement 
Nation,31 was cited in it); but, by Saturday, it had been formally 
withdrawn. The Republican Study Committee had quickly issued a 
statement claiming that the report was not properly vetted and that an 
oversight resulted in its mistaken release. Many people questioned the 
official explanation and wondered if powerful lobbying efforts behind 
the scenes explained the abrupt about-face and mea culpa. 
 There remain a lot of questions as to why the report came down. 
But, regardless of what happened, the very fact that the report came out 
at all under the aegis of the Republican Study Committee suggests that 
there is unusual potential for an alliance here between progressives, on 
one hand, who are looking to question corporate power and welfare 
from a social justice point of view (and who are asking how copyright 
law might cut across color, gender and socioeconomic lines) and free-
market conservatives, on the other hand, who are concerned about 
undue government regulation of the economy and the inefficiency 
consequences. Both sides also have shown concern about the impact of 
copyright on the vindication of First Amendment values. 
 Meanwhile, you see a sizeable rift occurring between two 
traditional Democratic bases—Hollywood and Silicon Valley. 
Hollywood, of course, is strongly supportive of a strong copyright 
regime to protect content creators, whereas Silicon Valley, as evidence 
by what happened with the SOPA and PIPA protests, has increasingly 
questioned the unfettered expansion of copyright. The tectonics of the 
emerging copyright world are an area rife for analysis. 
 There is one final note I want to leave you with. I don’t often talk 
about my practice life when I’m speaking before a group of law 
professors because they often look down on it. They might see me as 
less of a scholar as a result. Likewise, I don’t often talk about my 
professorial life when I’m speaking before a group of lawyers because 
they often look down on it. They might see me as less of a skilled 
 
                                                   
31 See JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU (2011). 
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tactician and practitioner as a result. But critical intellectual property 
law is an environment where the two areas—focusing on the theory and 
actually putting it into practice—can meet. 
 One thing I’ve always tried to do is to take the cases that I work 
on—including a lot that I do on a pro bono basis—and get my students 
involved. This provides law students with a direct opportunity to 
experience litigation related to critical intellectual property activism. 
For instance, in one example, I had students help with a fair use defense 
for a senatorial candidate famously sued for copyright infringement by a 
well-known music icon for using his songs in a campaign ad. In another 
case, I had students working on behalf of a critically acclaimed artist in 
a dispute against one of the big music publishers. 
 I think on a small practical level, there is a lot we can do as law 
professors and, for you in the audience who are law students right now, 
I would urge you to take advantage of your time in the academy to gain 
practical experience in IP. It is such an exciting and dynamic field and it 
will enhance your education immeasurably to put some teeth into 
critical copyright theory by taking the skills that you’re learning in the 
classroom and applying them in the field through IP activism. Thank 
you very much. 
 
BRETT FRISCHMANN: One of the questions I had in reading Victoria’s 
paper was trying to make the connection between critical legal studies 
and critical legal activism, and in particular critical legal activism in the 
context of net activism or netroots activism. I am going to throw out a 
couple of questions that are all connected and just ask each of you to 
respond to the particular question that jumps out at you . . .   
First, is net activism special?  Or is it critical?  And when is net 
activism not critical?  How might we distinguish “critical legal 
activism” as opposed to just plain old “activism?” 
 Relatedly, what about netroots movements make them powerful 
or weak, effective or perhaps ineffective?  The reason I ask is that I 
wonder whether we should systematically study these developments 
before we celebrate them?  In other words, might we be putting too 
much attention on the few that seem to succeed without also paying 
attention to the many that fail or the many that don't quite arise or get 
the public attention that's necessary?   
After that, we can come back to the role of academics in legal 
education in this kind of area. 
 
VICTORIA EKSTRAND: Certainly, net activism has many of the same 
characteristics as regular activism. But there is something unique about 
the Internet's infrastructure, that in reaching people like your 16-year 
old cousin, it has really helped to empower them in a way that I think 
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the initial CLS scholarship, the initial crits were talking about. That was 
really the thing that was not as present, in CLS 1.0. I think in that sense 
this conversion into action by virtue of some of these net tools is really, 
really quite powerful. Evgeny Morozov’s work warns a lot of us who 
get excited about the Internet to stop getting so excited. He's apt to label 
a lot of us, perhaps, as Internet solutionists. I'm pretty mindful of that 
critique but there is this tendency, now, for a lot of these folks to just 
click, yes, I agree and, you know, I'm going to send another tweet to my 
Congressman or whatever. 
 Perhaps there's more to it than just getting excited about a tweet 
or sending yet another email to a member of Congress, however. I do 
think that there is an opportunity. I think students in particular have this 
sense that they have these tools at their disposal and will use them.  
  
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN: I have two thoughts about that. One, what kind 
of activism isn’t digitally mediated? I mean, is there anybody really 
planning an activist campaign that its specific issue is social media or 
YouTube?  What kind of idiot would do that, right?  How are we going 
to test this proposition?  That’s one thing. 
 Secondly, it’s important to remember that when human beings 
want to get something done, they employ the tools that are available. 
So, if what is available is the telegraph, you use the telegraph. If what is 
available is the telephone, you use the telephone. If what is available is 
Twitter, you use Twitter. There’s nothing really profound about that. 
 Now that’s not to say that those media systems have the same 
reach into the world, that they don’t have different levels of friction 
embedded in them, but it’s never a simple story. So, one of the things 
about the activist ecosystem today is that there is so much noise. I mean 
we are, if we are engaged with any sort of activist movement from any 
political position right now, instantly profiled as the sort of person who 
would be and are thus barraged with many more requests for our 
attention and our money. So, that creates a tremendous amount of 
diffusion of attention, right to the point where, “how do I know what 
I’m going to focus on?  How do I know whether I’m actually making a 
difference?  How do I know whether I’ve just clicked to support 
Planned Parenthood and whether that’s going to matter more than the 
check that I write to some other group?” 
 Those are all questions that, I think Brett Frischmann’s 
inclination was right. It is going to be years until we figure out a 
measurable way of assessing how these tools have altered the political 
environment of just the United States, let alone the world. It’s great that 
Brett pointed out, and I think very helpful that Brett pointed out, that we 
often focus on the successes. 
 One thing that really bugs me about a lot of my peers’ writing, is 
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that Wikipedia is like the universal solvent in all of it. Like “oh my 
gosh, look at Wikipedia!”  Therefore, anything can be like Wikipedia 
without recognizing that Wikipedia is essentially special, perhaps a one-
off, right, that we’re waiting for the second Wikipedia. We’re waiting 
for the second Talking Points Memo to revolutionize journalism 
although, you know, maybe The Huffington Post is that. We’re waiting 
for the Howard Dean campaign to finally win a primary. We’re waiting 
for all of those things. 
And so focusing on failure as well as the successes is really 
important. And analyze!  You know that we have the tools today that 
we didn’t have five years ago, and we’ll have a different set of tools in 
five years. People are going to use whatever tools are around. I’m not 
sure that we’re in a position to generalize too much about it. 
 Now the Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) and the Protect IP 
Act (“PIPA”) movement is fascinating for a couple of reasons. It has to 
do with not just the fact that Wikipedia was involved or Google was 
involved or that Reddit was where your cousin found out about it. Those 
are important parts of it. But let’s not forget that a lot of us were 
banging the pots and pans together for more than a decade to get a 
vocabulary, to get a narrative, to get a set of clear examples and a 
couple of nightmare stories out there, so that enough people—even if 
they were just elites—understood that there was a lot at stake here. 
 It took from 1998 to 2012 to essentially prime the public or a 
sufficient segment of the public to care about things like this and enable 
that sort of reaction. So the people who were alarmed by what they read 
on Reddit about SOPA and PIPA probably ran to a book, ran to a 
website, ran to the EFF site, picked up Larry Lessig’s book, picked up 
John’s stuff and said, “here’s something I can actually digest that can 
make sense of it and this is why I care and this is what I can do about 
it.” 
Now Reddit provides a tremendous forum for rage. But it’s not the 
only one. And in that particular case it was very helpful. There are a 
dozen cases in which Reddit was not such a great example of rage. 
 
JOHN TEHRANIAN: I think it useful to have a healthy dollop of 
skepticism about what happened with SOPA and PIPA. I always think 
about what Larry Lessig said in the wake of his disappointment about 
his arguments not carrying the day in the Eldred case: “what do you 
expect when you’re fighting all the money in the world.” 
 What was different about SOPA and PIPA—unfortunately and 
maybe cynically—was that all the money in the world there wasn’t in 
favor of SOPA and PIPA; instead, there was a lot of money on the other 
side and that’s what made it a fairer fight. If you think about it 
chronologically, the debate over SOPA and PIPA was taking place right 
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around the same time as the Occupy Wall Street Movement. We don’t 
even talk about Occupy Wall Street anymore. It seems like it’s gone—
and WikiLeaks too. Those are movements where all the money in the 
world was on one side and look what happened to them even though 
they had access to the Internet—they had the youth, and they had the 
new tools of digital democracy at their disposal. 
 SOPA and PIPA were perhaps different because they had 
Google. Google and a whole coalition of very powerful companies 
could countervail the forces of Hollywood. Now that’s not to say it 
wasn’t a big moment; it was. But I think it’s also important to recognize 
that what made the SOPA/PIPA moment different is that there’s money 
now on both sides of the debate. That makes for a fairer fight. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: [inaudible question] 
 
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN: It’s really unhealthy to bracket out copyright 
from any of these other information policy issues. Facebook’s new 
quasi-operating system for your phone is essentially a massive 
surveillance tool to make sure that Facebook knows everything you do 
on your phone. That’s really why it’s there. It’s not because you are 
tired of making three clicks to get to Facebook. It’s really there to make 
sure that every app-active gets filtered through Facebook and thus 
monitored so Facebook has a much better idea. 
 Now there may not be any harm to that, but that’s certainly not 
what we’re told about it. So that’s just one of many issues where people 
who have a critical stance from a scholarly or an intellectual point of 
view or critical journalist should be connecting with activists, should be 
making it clear that that’s a front where we need a narrative and we 
need a vocabulary and we need stories exactly like that to raise 
awareness, because these are not separate issues. Julie Cohen made it 
clear a decade ago that copyright and privacy are not separate sides of 
the issue. That in fact digital rights management, a big part of that was 
knowing what your customers are doing. 
 So, I think that leads us to ask a series of questions about where we 
should go with the critical legal studies/critical information studies/free 
culture movement. What should we be focusing on next?  I have a few 
ideas obviously. 
 One is challenging this notion that information is information and 
that information maximalism is our goal; that the idea that what we’re 
fighting for is the good of the Internet. Well, that’s probably not a good 
idea. What we’re fighting for is the good of the people and it just so 
happens that the Internet is an important tool in many of those battles, 
but it’s not the only answer. So we should not essentialize the Internet 
or essentialize Internet freedom. 
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 It really is about what people can do. There are all sorts of 
limitations on what people can do and all sorts of pitfalls. So we have to 
keep challenging corporate platforms. We can’t be satisfied with the 
occasional friend on our side, on one particular issue, and thus absolve 
it of all of its sins or problems, especially when they claim to be 
champions of the public interest. 
 We also—and Sonia brought this up last session—have to 
challenge the liberal US-centric narrative of the public domain by 
paying close attention to the demands of cultural citizenship in all its 
forms around the world and not just the liberal individualism with 
which we’re so comfortable playing. And as Andrew Ross brought up 
in an important article that Victoria cited in her paper, we have to pay 
attention to labor issues as well. We have to understand that a lot of the 
valorization and celebration of the public domain and radical freedom 
goes hand in hand with the dissolution of the status of labor as well. 
 So these are the different ways we should be thinking through in 
complicated ways that may actually undermine our political efficiency 
but in fact will, I would say. But I think that as responsible scholars 
these are issues we really can’t avoid.  
 
BRETT FRISCHMANN: Victoria, I want to give you one last chance to 
make your pitch to this audience of eager and anxious students. Is there 
something you want to close on?  We used your paper to anchor this 
session. I want to come back to you. 
 
VICTORIA EKSTRAND: You may call me an optimist, but I think John's 
story about his 16-year old cousin really helps to illustrate this so well 
and the fact that for those of us who are listening to our students well 
enough, we are seeing these tools work. They are fleeting—I will 
concede that these movements come through. There are opportunities 
that are grabbed and then they move on. These are not very highly 
centralized groups that are coming together. They're very loosely 
formed. 
 Nonetheless, they are adding significant value in the discussion 
and the debate about IP policy. I never would have imagined, for 
example, that my mother would ever ask  me to explain to her what fair 
use is about. We have been discussing this for a number of years now 
but I do think that folks are more involved. They just are. And the 
Internet does help to facilitate that. 
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PANEL III: POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC IN IP & 
INFO LAW POLICY MAKING  
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MICHAEL BURSTEIN: We have been moving gradually from the 
theoretical to the practical. Having examined the impact of critical legal 
studies (“CLS”) in the academy and having discussed the intersection 
between scholarship and activism, we now turn to the nitty-gritty 
questions of how to actually enact change in intellectual property and 
information law and policy. 
 It seems that the political economy of intellectual property and 
technology policy has changed in very interesting ways that pose certain 
challenges to actors in this space.To oversimplify a bit, tech policy used 
to be somewhat easier to understand in the 1990 is and I think even into 
the early 2000 is. It tended to be somewhat siloed—which is to say that 
issues were more distinct from one another—within each issue you 
could tell a relatively straightforward story about how policy developed 
based on social choice theory, political economy, and competing 
interest groups. For example, in 1998 the Copyright Term Extension 
Act was pushed by the content industries, who were able to exert 
enormous influence in Congress as compared to a relatively dispersed 
and unorganized group of folks who were on the other side. With 
respect to telecom policy in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the 
Bells were running the show for the most part, pushing against 
somewhat more organized interests among Congress people but by and 
large they sort of shaped that legislation and in particular shaped the 
litigation that led to its mostly demise in the years immediately 
following passage. And the folks who were interested in telecom policy 
and the folks who were interested in copyright policy for the most part 
didn't talk to one another. These two pieces of legislation were the 
product of legislative compromises between largely distinct actors. This 
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is no longer the case. The simple world, to the extent that it was simple 
of the 1990 is, has been complicated in I think at least three ways.  
One is the number of players and their interests, so the arrival on 
the scene of tech policy of companies like Google and Facebook that 
have their hands in multiple issues and that are distinct from the 
traditional industry incumbents such as Hollywood on the one hand and 
say telecom or cable providers on the other hand. We've also seen the 
maturation of the public interest community in this space. Organizations 
like Public Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier Foundation have 
come into their own as forces in tech policy. And of course we've seen 
the rise of a grassroots or netroots movement that uses technology, and 
tends to be much more organized than the sort of disparate public 
interest or grassroots type movements that attempted to gin up 
opposition to copyright extension or to telecommunications reform in 
the 1990 is. 
 The second way in which the world has become more 
complicated is the range of issues that people who are interested in this 
space have to confront and the ways in which they interact with one 
another. So these issues have all moved out of their silos. So now if one 
is interested in tech policy, one can't for the most part be interested 
solely in telecommunications regulation or solely in copyright.  
 One has to have one is hands in each of these issues because 
they're all very much interrelated. And they're also bound up with a 
range of new issues, things like cyber security, things like free 
expression, that has become of much greater salience than it was in 
years past, and even things like entrepreneurial policy and funding 
concerns. Tech policy activists find themselves talking about securities 
regulation when they talk about the Jobs Act and whether or not the 
securities laws can accommodate things like crowd funding. 
 Finally, the number of forums in which these issues are debated 
and in which policy is actually made have become somewhat more 
complicated. So it is no longer just Congress and the regulatory 
agencies; there are private sort of self-help measures that are deeply 
enmeshed in policy questions. Much of policy has shifted to the 
international stage, to negotiations for treaties between the United States 
and other nations. New regulatory actors have become much more 
powerful. The Copyright Office itself, which used to be a ministerial 
office responsible solely for copyright registrations, has now taken an 
active role in policymaking as the result of many new statutory 
innovations. 
 To guide us through this complex world; we have a terrific set of 
panelists before us.  
Derek Khanna is a Visiting Fellow at the Yale Information Society 
Project. He is also a Policy Advisor to the Department of Defense 
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Science Board on Cyber Security and he is a J.D. candidate at 
Georgetown. And Derek comes to us from a background as a 
Congressional staffer. So he was on the staff of the Republican Study 
Committee and is the author of the now notorious paper that was 
mentioned on the last panel in which Derek advocated for copyright 
policy based on weaker copyright protections, a position completely 
consistent with conservative free market principles but anathema to the 
incumbent industries who are concerned with this particular policy area. 
 Jessica Litman is the John F. Nickoll Professor of Law at the 
University of Michigan. Her distinguished academic career has taken 
her to Michigan, to Wayne State University, to NYU, American 
University and to the University of Tokyo. Jessica has in many ways 
bridged the gap between academics and activism both in her writings 
which include some of the seminal critiques of copyright in the digital 
world and in her work outside of the academy where she has served on 
the Advisory Boards of Public Knowledge, the IP and Internet 
Committee of the ACLU and the Advisory Council of The Future of 
Music Coalition, among many other extracurricular endeavors. 
 Sherwin Siy is the Vice President of Legal Affairs at Public 
Knowledge where he coordinates the organization's work on copyright 
issues. He was previously staff counsel at EPIC, the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center. So these are organizations that have really emerged 
at the forefront of public interest work in technology policy. And his 
current employer, Public Knowledge, is actively involved in legislative 
debates, rulemaking proceedings, and litigation over a variety of tech 
policy issues. 
 And finally Rick Whitt is the Vice President and Global Head of 
Public Policy and Government Relations at Motorola Mobility. Prior to 
that position he was at Google for more than five years serving as 
Director and Managing Counsel for Federal Policy and for Telecom and 
Media Policy. So Rick has spent much of his career in the trenches in 
Washington representing some of the leading technology companies 
before Congress and Federal agencies concerning IP, privacy, cyber 
security, free expression, and internet governance issues. 
 Rick has also written a terrific paper that the AELJ is going to 
publish that advocates for better alignment between the logical structure 
and the functional structure of the internet and the governance regimes 
to which it is subject. So with that brief introduction, I'm going to turn it 
over to the panelists and invite each of them to spend about ten minutes 
or so sort of reflecting on the state of telecom policy and the political 
economy of intellectual property and tech policy and what we can do 
actually to enact change in these areas?     
 
DEREK KHANNA:  I’m Derek Khanna and I wrote the memorandum on 
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copyright reform for the Republican Study Committee (“RSC”). What 
the last panel left out of the story is that two weeks after the RSC 
released my memorandum I was told that I would not be retained as a 
staffer—which is why I no longer work on Capitol Hill. 
I wanted to briefly touch on the memorandum that I wrote for the 
RSC because I think it frames some of the issues that we’re talking 
about here on how to move forward on intellectual property issues. 
First, in contrast to the previous panelist’s characterization of the memo, 
I wouldn’t really describe it as advocating for being weaker on 
infringement of intellectual property. I think it’s more about jiggering 
the way we look at intellectual property law. 
I think most law students who encounter copyright law for the first 
time probably ask themselves, “What rational system could have come 
up with this regime of copyright, this hodgepodge, where if the content 
is from the 1920s then you have this one system of laws, but if the 
content was a corporate work or after 1920s, you have a different 
system of laws?” I don’t think that any student can really parse through 
it and conclude that it is logical. The reason is because there isn’t a 
logical coherent theory that strings it all together. 
Instead, it’s the result of lobbyists that have succeeded in 
perverting the law and perverting the way that we frame issues that 
relate to copyright. I’ve written that success in perverting the law, in 
perverting how we frame these issues and think about these issues, 
should not be confused with constitutional fidelity. Just because these 
lobbyists, such as the Motion Picture Association of America 
(“MPAA”) and the Recording Industry Association of America 
(“RIAA”), are using 18th Century vernacular does not actually make the 
policy they are espousing consistent with constitutional principles. So if 
lobbyists saying things like “natural rights” or “property rights,” that 
doesn’t actually, magically, make their policy constitutional or 
consistent with our Founding Fathers’ intent. 
My memorandum, which ultimately led to my no longer being a 
staffer on the Hill, talked about a series of myths in how we frame 
copyright issues. The first myth is that copyright is free market 
capitalism at work. I argued that instead it’s a guaranteed government-
instituted, government-subsidized content monopoly. The second myth 
is that the current copyright legal regime leads to the greatest innovation 
and productivity. I argued that copyright is a Goldilocks-like balance: 
we want some copyright, but not too much. And, whereas too much 
copyright can stifle innovation and content, not enough of it can stifle 
content creation. I argued that our current poorly-crafted 
implementation of copyright has resulted in the hindering of a whole 
variety of types of innovation. 
Specifically, my memorandum advocated for reforming statutory 
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damages, expanding fair use, dealing with false takedown requests 
under the DMCA, and limiting the term-length of copyright to 46 years. 
After my memorandum was released, it was endorsed by many major 
conservative organizations, with The American Conservative Union 
(“ACU”) even putting it up on their website. Unfortunately, within 24 
hours, the RSC removed the memorandum from its website. Shortly 
thereafter, my memorandum became ridiculed by some critics and 
industry lobbyists who referred to me as a Marxist because I was 
advocating going back to the Constitution and figuring out what 
actually leads to the most economic growth. 
So, after I left Capitol Hill, I wanted to figure out the best way to 
move forward on intellectual property reform. When I was on Capitol 
Hill I tried to frame the debate and talk about broad, high-level ideas for 
the optimal way to approach reforming our entire system of copyright. 
But off of Capitol Hill, my approach was to take on small, targeted 
campaigns in order to reform copyright with small victories. 
I thought that was an important thing for me to talk to you all 
about today because we are all now off Capitol Hill. I think a lot of us 
saw the success of the campaign against the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(“SOPA”) and thought to ourselves, “How can we do something more 
than just stop legislation?  How can we actually put something positive 
on the table?” 
I wrote an article on Boing Boing, a technology website, in which I 
laid out my perspective and discussed what I saw as a cohesive strategy 
going forward. I said this fight is going to take engaging our generation. 
And it’s going to take a movement. To that end, allow me to suggest the 
following pointer: we cannot continue to stay on the defensive, 
watching and waiting for the next SOPA. If we slumber they will sneak 
provisions into law that effectively do the same things as SOPA. 
Therefore, the best defense is a solid offense. 
Many provisions of SOPA have already been implemented through 
other means. For example, the United States government has used 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement to go after infringing websites. 
Lobbyists have been engaging in international treaty making, through 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, to potentially filter Internet 
communication, implement a three strikes policy, and re-codify parts of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Private companies have also 
implemented the provisions of SOPA that allowed for the takedown of 
infringing websites and also cut off payment processors such as 
American Express, Mastercard, and Visa from supporting the infringing 
websites. These payment processors have largely cut off funding to 
those websites, in the absence of any law requiring them to do so. In my 
piece in Boing Boing I argued that we must analyze existing law 
because we will realize that our current laws (and regulatory structures) 
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are in some ways nearly as nefarious and dangerous as SOPA would 
have been. 
We must recognize that progress will require support from both 
Republicans and Democrats alike and therefore we need to be strategic 
in our battle choices. We need to realize that while we may have 
different perspectives and different priorities, we need to focus on areas 
of common interest where we form a collective whole. 
We must also recognize that in this fight for meaningful copyright 
reform, we are the insurgents, and so we need to be looking for those 
asymmetrical battles rather than taking on whole-hog, major, pie-in-the-
sky reforms on day one. My first battle was on the issue of cell phone 
unlocking because I saw this issue as representing a major misstep by 
the “other side”—the big content industry side. 
By way of background, on January 26, 2013, it became illegal for 
individuals to unlock their own phones. Unlocking your phone is a 
process by which you change the settings on your phone to allow you to 
use a SIM card (a card that essentially securely stores mobile subscriber 
data) from another carrier. Basically, you take an AT&T phone, and 
“unlock it” so that you may use it on another wireless carrier. This is a 
technology that is pro-free market and that exists in every cell phone 
market in the world, but is now illegal for American citizens. 
It was made illegal because AT&T and Verizon asked for it to be 
illegal through their trade association, The Wireless Association. AT&T 
and Verizon spend $32 million annually on lobbying, so it’s not 
surprising that they were successful. But it is surprising that there are 
over 100 wireless carriers on the other side of this issue, in support of 
unlocking, whose voices were ignored. Nonetheless, on January 26th, it 
became illegal for individuals to unlock their cell phones, and 
potentially 32 million Americans became felons and face the prospect 
of spending five years in prison and paying a $500,000 dollar fine for 
simply unlocking their own phone. And I know the immediate response 
is “oh well, who’s going to enforce that law?  It’s very unlikely that 
anyone would be arrested for it.” 
In response, I argue that laws that are seldom enforced but could 
be enforced against everyone are the most nefarious. And so I led a 
campaign on this issue, first highlighting the issue in The Atlantic 
magazine and proving how the cell phone unlocking ban made a person 
who unlocks her phone liable for five years in prison. I helped to create 
a White House petition on the issue, which collected 114,000 
signatures. But before I did that I reached out to members of Congress 
and said let’s get in front of this issue. Let’s just fix this problem. At the 
time I didn’t receive many substantive responses. 
Once our White House petition reached 114,000 signatures (the 
first petition to get over the new 100,000 threshold), the White House 
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reversed its previous decision—a decision made by the Librarian of 
Congress through executive rulemaking, which banned cell phone 
unlocking—and endorsed cell phone unlocking. The FCC then 
announced an investigation into the matter. And now members of 
Congress are tripping over themselves to introduce legislation of their 
own. We now have four bills on the issue—H.R. 1123, H.R. 1892, 
S.467, and S. 481. 
What this shows is that if you take an isolated asymmetrical battle 
and you demonstrate that there is a collective will to move forward on it 
and you make your legal case, you can often succeed in positive 
reforms. 
I think there are many other battles like unlocking in the future. 
The next one I see on the horizon is dealing with accessible technology 
for persons who are blind and deaf. There is technology that could help 
persons who are blind and deaf to consume and enjoy media; but that 
technology is illegal for them to use. That doesn’t make any sense. And 
in fact, the law is implemented in such a crazy way that there’s an 
existing exception for technology, allowing them to use the technology, 
but the exception means that if a blind person develops the code himself 
then he can have closed captioning for a movie. That also doesn’t make 
any sense. 
The idea that closed captioning of movies, read aloud functionality 
for books, or phone unlocking has something to do with piracy and 
copyright is absurd. As a supporter of copyright, I think there’s a way to 
move forward on these issues without touching the third rail of piracy. 
In so doing, we can create a coalition of the willing, and more 
importantly, have a discussion on Capitol Hill that leads to rational laws 
that protect copyright and deal with piracy without inhibiting 
innovation. 
 
JESSICA LITMAN: A little bit of background: Congress has essentially 
delegated its copyright lawmaking authority to copyright lobbyists. This 
has been true for more than 100 years. When there’s new copyright 
legislation, copyright lobbyists will get together to figure out what the 
bill should say, and they exclude from the bargaining table people at 
whose expense they hope to change the law. Those targets, though, find 
out about the effort, show up, and usually succeed in blocking the bill. 
The Copyright Term Extension Act, for example, was opposed by 
bars and restaurants that resented paying money to the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). This kept the 
Copyright Term Extension Act from being enacted for several years. 
Finally, the bill developed an exception that allowed sports bars to play 
copyrighted music without copyright liability. The WTO has 
determined that that exception violates the Agreement on Trade Related 
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Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), but that was the 
price that bar and restaurant owners were able to exact from copyright 
owners eager to get the term extension law enacted. 
Copyright lobbyists in this process never seem to invite the targets 
to negotiate over the bills, and never seem to take their interests into 
account, even though they must know that that makes it more likely that 
disfavored industry groups will be able to defeat the legislation. One 
reason for that, I think, is that copyright lawyers have learned that there 
is a strategic advantage in being able to design the shape of the initial 
bill. It’s easier to do that if the interests you hope the bill will 
inconvenience are not in the room. 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) is really a 
combination of several different bills, all pasted together in aesthetically 
unpleasing form. One of the pieces of that bill, the WIPO Treaties 
Implementation Act, contains the anti-circumvention provisions that 
Derek Khanna discussed in connection with cell phones and blind 
people. Those provisions were initially drafted by lobbyists for 
copyright owners. Another part of the DMCA is the Internet Service 
Provider Safe Harbor Notice and Takedown. Those provisions were 
initially drafted by representatives of telephone companies and Internet 
service providers. I think that copyright-owner lobbyists have decided 
that they didn’t get a good bargain with the notice and takedown 
system; meanwhile, the interests that negotiated exceptions to the anti-
circumvention provisions have since discovered that most of the 
exceptions are useless. That may have lead to a sense that it’s important 
to control the design of the basic architecture of any copyright 
amendment, so that one can narrow the damage that other interests may 
be seeking to impose. 
Another reason that important interests are excluded from 
negotiations may be that some copyright lobbyists have views on who is 
and is not a legitimate participant in the bargaining. In the aftermath of 
SOPA, Paramount sent out a corporate vice president to talk to law 
students all over the country. He came here, to Cardozo Law School. He 
also visited my class at Michigan. And, what we learned from his 
presentation was that the story that the motion picture studios were 
telling each other about what happened to SOPA was that Darth Google 
had whipped people into a frenzy by telling them lies about SOPA. 
My students asked the Paramount vice president some questions 
about specific provisions in the bill that they found to be particularly 
unsettling. He responded that (as, he insisted, Darth Google knew full 
well), there had been a secret manager’s amendment that didn’t have 
those particular provisions. Paramount felt it was improper for ordinary 
citizens to respond to the text of the only version of the bill that had 
been made public, rather than to the secret manager’s amendment that 
Transcripts Galley 7.12 _ FINAL (Do Not Delete) 7/12/2013  5:31 PM 
650 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 31:597 
might not have been that bad. 
One lesson that I take from this story is that studios may not have 
realized yet that readers, listeners, viewers, and other members of the 
audience are legitimate participants entitled to have views about 
copyright law. Indeed, the studios apparently haven’t yet reconciled 
themselves to the idea that Darth Google is a legitimate player entitled 
to sit at the table and negotiate with them over the shape of copyright 
legislation. 
Sherwin Siy has spent all sorts of time, successfully I think, getting 
Public Knowledge a seat at the table, but copyright lobbyists don’t 
necessarily listen to what he says. 
I can tell an optimistic story or I can tell a pessimistic story. The 
pessimistic story is that, gee whiz, the pendulum has now swung toward 
public involvement in IP policy and that feels great but, you know what, 
that pendulum is going to swing right back very soon. 
Meanwhile, copyright lobbyists effectively control the lawmaking 
process. Now that they realize that ordinary people may make trouble, 
they have all sorts of great tools and strategies to respond to that threat. 
One strategy is to control the initial draft and then limit and narrow any 
exceptions. Another strategy is to embody what copyright owners want 
to do in a treaty. It turns out that copyright interests can maintain much 
more control and secrecy by going overseas and putting the provisions 
they hope to enact into domestic law into an intellectual property treaty. 
And while the White House has recently responded to two online 
petitions about IP policy—one , urging the administration to support an 
amendment to make cell phone unlocking legal and another to require  
open-access publication of federally-funded research—by voicing 
significant concern for the public interest, the administration also seems 
adamant that we’ve got no right to know what it is we’re signing away 
in treaties about IP. 
The optimistic story I could tell is this: Gee whiz, people seem to 
be paying attention to copyright law. Politicians might be beginning to 
pay attention to the fact that people are paying attention. The thing 
that’s been missing has been ways to convey ordinary people’s views 
about copyright policy to legislators in terms they can understand and 
will take seriously. Sherwin’s organization, Public Knowledge, has been 
working hard to figure out ways to do that. The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation is another organization that has been harnessing public 
opinion and energy in constructive ways. You can look at the success of 
the two petitions as a sign that maybe at least the White House thinks 
that ordinary people are legitimate voices. 
But the one thing I learned when I tried actually to do this in 
connection with the DMCA—as opposed to sitting in my ivory tower 
and writing about it—is that lawmaking is a job for professionals. 
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Amateurs screw it up. In the 1990s, a group of academics and public 
interest organizations joined forces to try to bring some sanity to the 
legislation that grew up to be the DMCA. Boy, did we screw that up. 
We had the best of intentions. But, you know, we got played. Copyright 
lobbyists whipped us. 
 
RICK WHITT: Good afternoon everybody. It’s a pleasure to be here. 
Thanks for the invitation. So since the late 1980’s, I’ve been a 
practicing policy advocate in D.C—that’s a fancy term for lobbyist—
first in law firm life, and then for a company called MCI 
Communications, which I think passed away before most of you were in 
elementary school. And then over to Google, and now at Motorola, 
which was acquired by Google. 
I’ve also written a number of law journal articles, one of which, as 
was mentioned, is out in front there and will be published very shortly 
by the AELJ. So like other folks here on the panel, I have some idea of 
both sides of the debate here and around the politics of them. 
I was trained as a political science major in college, and a guy 
named John Kingdon has written a pretty well-known book about how 
the political process really works—not just the way it can be seen from 
afar, but analyzing many examples of how the political process unfolds 
particularly in Washington D.C. He famously has talked about his own 
view, after looking at many of these examples and really digging deeply 
into the facts, that it is really ideas more than pressure that normally 
wins the day in Washington. 
I consider him an optimist. I’m not entirely sure that he’s correct. I 
think that a lot of the issues we’re talking about now really amounts to 
the notion that at the end of the day, the truth of ideas will ultimately 
win out over the sort of inside game of the partisans in Washington, and 
in other capitols around the world as well. And SOPA/PIPA really helps 
crystallize that issue for us. 
On the one hand it was a victory, right?  Because of the Internet 
blackout day, we had something like fourteen million emails that were 
sent in to Congress. They were just overloaded—their servers, the 
phone calls, so that folks who had one day endorsed the bill ran away 
from it the very next day. I think it was Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren 
who said, “this was the first time a bill went from becoming inevitable 
to unthinkable in the course of a single day.” 
That was because of the forces that were unleashed from the 
corporate side, from, of course, the nonprofit side, and many other 
folks, ordinary citizens, got engaged. It was an enormous success. But 
it’s a success that I fear is difficult to replicate. I think it’s one of these 
situations that was a crystallizing of concerns. It was a well-organized 
effort by a lot of folks. It hit at the right moment in time, just as the 
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White House was starting to have its own second thoughts about the 
situation. I think these demonstrations of power can be tough to harness. 
Then over time, in fact, they can often lose their novelty and their 
impact. 
It is my concern that, yes, we won, but we won frankly because of 
political pressure that was put to bear on Congress. It was unorthodox, 
right; it was unusual. It was having the platform of the Net out there as 
the means through which, people organized and expressed themselves. 
But it didn’t necessarily convince. It was convincing politically, but not 
intellectually. 
This is where I come back to this notion of political pressure 
versus ideas. You know, there were dozens and dozens of Internet 
engineers who patiently sifted through the various legislative vehicles, 
of the language that was out there and the various drafts of the bills both 
in the House and the Senate. They then crafted testimony that was never 
heard. They submitted letter to members of Congress that I think 
frankly were never read. 
They patiently and carefully pointed out some of the real issues 
with the legislation in terms of how it was going to mess around with 
the domain name system, and many of the key numbering and routing 
and addressing elements of the Net, in ways that were going to have 
pernicious effects on substantial innocent uses (i.e., folks who were not 
violating copyright law but would be deemed to be because the 
mechanisms would be way over inclusive). Ironically they pointed out 
that there were a number of technical countermeasures that could be 
employed by those who wanted to get around the mandates in the bill, 
which would thus render it ineffective. So they were trying to do their 
best to show even for those who didn’t care at all about the potential 
overbreadth, that the legislation was just not going to do what they 
thought it was going to do in terms of effectiveness. 
But those voices were not heard. And even today, you know, we 
have the lobbyists on the other side who are thinking, “well, gosh, we 
have to just harness the users the same way that this big bad Google and 
Wikipedia and others did.”  Maybe we can have five-minute 
commercials in front of every movie, shown in every movie theater 
across the country. We could tell our side of the story, right?  We have 
that ability. That is our platform, so why don’t we use that?  So we still 
don’t have a meeting of minds in terms of the notion that, yes, we can 
agree that the unlawful sale of content is a bad thing and we should try 
to find some reasonably effective measures to deal with that without 
otherwise harming innocent uses of the content. 
Anyway, to me that is the sort of challenge we face, and my paper 
talks about that to some extent. The other bookend policy issue I’ll 
mention quickly from last year, which we haven’t really touched on 
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here today, is that the International Telecom Union (“ITU”) had 
something called the WCIT, which first I thought was a Broadway 
musical but, no, it’s actually the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications. And it’s a treaty organization. So again, as it’s 
been mentioned already, where you can go to get things accomplished, 
if you can’t get something through Congress as a national measure, then 
you typically go to treaty organizations. One of them, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, has already been mentioned. We’re in negotiations 
underway right now that might have some impact on copyright law. But 
we all don’t know about it because it’s all behind the scenes and behind 
closed doors and there are no drafts available for people to comment on. 
Last year the ITU was looking at various ways of getting involved 
in Internet governance. This was a situation where fortunately, we got 
enough governments involved, and the U.S. government took the lead 
here and a number of others did as well, to push back on those efforts. 
But it would have been a quite serious and pernicious impact in terms of 
the United Nations essentially getting involved for the first time to say 
they want to dictate what the protocols and standards look like. They 
don’t care what the engineers who’ve been doing this for forty plus 
years now have accomplished in terms of the Internet Protocol 
(“IP”),Transmission Control Protocol (“TCP”), the World Wide Web 
(“W3”), and all the other elements of the inner workings of the Web. 
They would take it upon themselves to create the new mandates. 
It’s breaking out in different places around the world, not just in 
the U.S., and it’s not just in the copyright area. I think this is a great 
debate, a great discussion we are having here today, and I look forward 
to a further conversation. Thanks. 
 
SHERWIN SIY: So I guess I want to sound a note of optimism after this 
just, because I think, you know, I don't want to disparage or minimize 
the work that these engineers did in writing these papers, putting 
together these letters and this testimony and getting that to The Hill 
because I think that actually had a good deal to do with priming a 
number of members offices, people who were in the middle who didn't 
know a lot about the issue, who might have been sold, you know, co-
sponsorship of SOPA or PIPA based on the fact that they were 
approached by their colleagues who said, yeah, this is uncontroversial, 
it's just another copyright enforcement bill, you know, we want to make 
sure that there's strong enforcement.  You know, and that's really about 
it. 
 They, you know, had been presented with a particular framework 
in this and maybe when they first received those letters they weren't in a 
position to step out and challenge, you know, challenge leadership, 
committee leadership or party leadership on it, but then with--you know 
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that was enough for them and their staffs to get some idea that there was 
an actual controversy there.  That there was another side and quite 
possibly more than two sides to this issue.  Then when you had a public 
protest movement behind it, that gave those--that work beforehand, 
gives that movement more legitimacy in their minds.  It gives them the 
knowledge that this is not just some sort of strange digital rabble pulling 
some sort of an elaborate prank. 
 One of the things that I wanted to talk about was the sort of 
instincts and assumptions that, you know, that might influence the way 
that Congress approaches these issues.  I think that you've heard some 
of them already, you know, that there isn't as much of a left/right divide 
on it.  There are differences in approaches as to how liberal versus 
conservative or libertarian approaches to copyright reform might come 
about.   
 There's the Silicon Valley versus Hollywood sort of dichotomy 
that people draw upon that frankly a lot of members do see as a real 
thing and, you know, when they are being presented with lobbyists from 
Silicon Valley and from Hollywood, well this is the framework they're 
going to take.  They will try, if they are being earnest about it to look at 
both sides of this issue when there are also the sides of consumers, 
publishers, libraries, cable distributors, all sorts of other people that 
might not make it in that room and that's how you end up with things 
like the Copyright Alert System. 
 I think that one of the other dichotomies that sort of presents 
itself, a series of assumptions that policymakers will have has to do with 
the distinction between copyright as being a specialized system that 
applies to a few different types of players and a generalized system that 
applies to everyone.  There's a few anecdotes that I think kind of 
illustrate this. 
 Maria Pallante, Register of Copyrights, was testifying before 
Congress fairly recently about basically the next great copyright act, 
sort of a fundamental reimaging of what the copyright law should look 
like.  There was, in the middle of her testimony, some comment, she 
actually talked about how copyright debates have become much more 
contentions in the years that she's been working in it.  She was thinking 
perhaps this is due to the fact that there's more money involved.  There's 
more lobbying. 
 There seemed to be, and maybe I'm ascribing this to her, but it 
struck me that she seemed to have a sort of nostalgia for the past where 
you would have, you know I think--again this is my imagining of her 
nostalgia but I'm imagining that, you know, she is envisioning this room 
full of esteemed copyright scholars debating finer points of the law, 
trying to get everything right.  It's the people, the scholars involved, the 
repeat--the people who are involved in repeat transactions with 
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intellectual property and so on, a collegial atmosphere. 
 In my--I take a look at that room and what I'm imagining that 
room looked like in the 50's and 60's and 70's and I think of a collusive 
atmosphere.  Not in the antitrust sense necessarily but, you know a club, 
right?  It's a place where you have implicit rules and norms as well as 
explicit rules which end up in the statute.   
 A couple of examples that I think illustrate that, you know fairly 
recently I was a guest lecturer, I don't know, at a seminar class of a 
noted copyright scholar.  I mentioned the fact, we were talking about 
the first sale doctrine and Kirtsaeng I mentioned just sort of in passing 
like, you know look, the distribution right is weird.  It's just very strange 
the way we do this and the way that Section 109, you know, the first 
sale doctrine is codified is very strange. 
 You can become a copyright infringer by not returning your 
friend's DVD and then putting it up on eBay.  That makes you a 
copyright infringer, not just a thief.  And she just had a very hard time 
believing this until I actually went back and said I'm pretty sure that's 
right, looked up Section 109 on my laptop and said, no, no, you have to 
be the owner of the particular copy in order to have the first sale 
doctrine apply to you.  She said, well, okay, that's interesting and she 
used that as a teaching moment to tell of her students and that is why 
you must always go back to the text. 
At the same time though she also said, still, really, who's going to 
bring those suits.  Who's going to make that?  Who's going to make 
those claims on those grounds?  The same thing happened in Kirtsaeng 
itself.  We would argue with people.  One of our favorite parts in our 
amicus brief was we cited that fact that how many donations Toys for 
Tots gives out, right, and there are copyrighted works embedded in toys, 
you know logos, designs, copyrighted text, software built in certain 
things.   
 Somebody said, well, nobody's going to sue Toys for Tots.  I 
think maybe not Toys for Tots, maybe not at first but certainly people 
will sue individual consumers.  And that's because we have in landscape 
where it's not just a series of colleagues and a series of repeat 
transactors dealing with each other.  It's a case where you're not talking 
about a major studio talking with a major broadcasting network in every 
case. 
 In each case you're also talking about much smaller entities and 
individual consumers who now stand in the shoes of being the 
distributors of and the competitors to people who hold copyrights.  So 
the fact is you know people are going to get sued.  You've got new 
players.  You've got consumers, users, hobbyists, and those people are 
going to get sued also because enforcement and I realize this is going to 
be controversial, enforcement is easier than ever, certainly by 
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percentage. 
 The number of infringing acts that are going to be visible by 
virtue of being networked is a lot higher than anything that happened in 
the past, right?  People aren't going to be--aren't switching--aren't 
swapping mixed cassette tapes and fewer mix CDs.  They're sharing 
those things online and that’s more visible so it's actually a higher 
percentage of enforcement is possible. 
 Now the numbers of infringing acts that won't be enforced I 
would estimate probably, just taking a wild guess, probably will 
increase just because you have more works and more networking 
available.  But of course, you know, all of those facts are very fuzzy 
because the studies we have are all over the place and sometimes 
suspect methodology. 
 The point that I want to get at with those anecdotes about the 
assumptions people have is that those are the assumptions that are baked 
into the heads of legislators.  And it's those attitudes that we're going to 
be wanting to challenge.  The other thing I want to close with is the idea 
that copyright reform is coming.  The fact that we have the Registrar of 
Copyrights saying that it's time to take a fresh look at these things 
means that we are going to be addressing these issues and not just the 
DMCA, not just circumvention and safe harbors, also possibly the 
framing of 106 rights generally, right? 
 Look people recognize that our system for digital, audio, public 
performance being wildly different from non-digital, audio public 
performance, that's very strange and sort of an artifact and something 
that probably shouldn't be distinguished in this way.  There's a lot of 
fundamental questions that are coming up.  One of the things that I'm 
hearing, that I hear a lot, in D.C. from people who I tend to side with a 
lot of the time is basically don't open up these issues. 
 If we open up this debate, we might lose ground.  I think if you're 
saying that and I'm not saying you shouldn't be strategic but I do think if 
you're saying that you are essentially saying the copyright law is as 
good now as it ever will be.  If that's the case I really should be looking 
for a new job.  Thank you. 
  
JESSICA LITMAN: I think as a historical matter, members of Congress, 
rather unreflectively, appear to have believed that the copyright statute 
did not in fact make individual readers, listeners, and viewers liable for 
copyright infringement. You can find clear evidence of this as recently 
as the early 1990s. Why did they think that? Did they think that it was 
fair use?  That’s unclear, but there seems to have been a general 
consensus, also shared by the Copyright Office, that the copyright law 
didn’t make individual, personal copying illegal. There is, I think, still 
some political salience to the idea of readers’ rights, listeners’ rights, 
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and consumers’ rights. I think that the first sale story is an effective 
story about the rights of readers and consumers. Many members of 
Congress may be willing to respond to that sort of story. Some of the 
pushback from the DMCA came from questions and stories about 
people who used bookmobiles. Members of Congress asked proponents 
of the DMCA whether the law would make bookmobiles illegal. So, to 
the extent that this can be expressed as a problem that Joe Constituent is 
going to have, I think that’s one wedge that may actually be effective. 
Congress has not yet sat down and said, “Oh gee, there’s all this piracy. 
I know what let’s do; let’s make every citizen in the United States liable 
for thousands of dollars in statutory damages.” 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: [inaudible question] 
 
RICK WHITT: That’s a good question that I don’t agree with the premise 
of. So, yes, there are some good arguments that a number of the 
countries that weighed in on in favor of proposals to have the ITU 
become more involved in Internet governance. They are concerned that 
the United States, through the contract it has with the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), and 
through its general influence as being one of the original originators and 
funders of the Internet, has too much sway and needs to be pulled back, 
and that the way that the Net is governed should be done in a much 
more multilateral fashion. 
The problem is, from my perspective at least, the ITU is the wrong 
kind of instrument to be using to do this kind of thing. The ITU is a 
government-to-government treaty organization. Private citizens and 
individuals cannot become members of the ITU. Their deliberations 
typically are not made public, so the transparency is pretty weak. Third 
parties are typically not invited. Companies, corporations, and certain 
other entities can become members, but they’d have access only to a 
limited number of documents so it’s not really a great place to have 
these kinds of open conversations. 
Then you look at the contrast of where are these decisions being 
made. ICANN is sort of unto itself, but really what ICANN does is 
around the domain name system and a few areas around the top-level 
domains, it’s actually relatively limited. I would argue that most of the 
power of the Internet’s architecture has come from what economist 
Eleanor Ostrom has called the polycentric governance groups, and 
that’s the Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”), and the World 
Wide Web Consortium (“W3C”). These are the groups of engineers, in 
most cases volunteers, and they increasingly come from corporations 
but represent themselves as individuals. They get together, their 
proposed standards and protocols are freely distributed, made available 
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ahead of time, and people can comment on them. People can come to 
the meetings virtually. They can come there in person. The process that 
they’ve used over the years have yielded some tremendous benefits in 
terms of the actual protocols, the openness of IP, and of the principles 
and the other things that are embedded now into the Internet. 
Those are the very things that are under attack at the ITU. What I 
would submit is that the ITU is both the wrong kind of instrument and 
the kinds of ways that they were thinking about going about exercising 
authority against the U.S. They would have had serious damaging 
lasting effects on the Internet. 
 
MICHAEL BURSTEIN: Maybe I'll invoke my moderator's privilege to ask 
the following question and bring our discussion back to the theme of the 
symposium, which is moving from scholarship to activism to political 
change.  So I'm curious, particularly those of you who have spent time 
on The Hill, Jessica told sort of cautionary tale with respect to the 
DMCA about policy being made by professionals, and Derek told or 
sort of juxtaposed the need for kind of broad frameworks with the need 
for sort of targeted, you know, asymmetrical particular bites that are 
winnable.  My question is the following: for those of us who inhabit the 
legal academy, is what we write in law journals at all relevant? And to 
the extent that those of us who write articles that appear in law journals 
do so out of a desire to help change things and to actually have an 
impact on policies, if you think the answer is no or not really, what 
more can we do to make what we do more relevant to the policy 
process?  What are the gaps that legal scholarship can fill? 
 
RICK WHITT: I can start on that one and I’ll go back to the person I 
mentioned earlier, John Kingdon, the political scientist. He has a 
memorable phrase; he talks about “the garbage can of politics.”  What 
he means by that is there are these different sorts of elements all mixed 
together in the political scene. He separates them out into three basic 
“policy streams,” as he calls them. 
The first stream is the notion of identifying problems—that’s what 
lots of members of Congress like to do, find things that are wrong with 
America and be seen as helping to fix them. Once you identify the 
problem, the second stream is then to identify what the solution might 
look like. Then the third stream is the actual political process that is 
engaged to actually get to that end game of the solution being enacted as 
law and implemented. 
What he talks about—and I think it makes a lot of sense, frankly—
is that you need to have all three of those streams to be successful. The 
problems identified tend to be something that occur sporadically. So 
there are all these sorts of policy windows that occur. Maybe it’s some 
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sort of national tragedy, some big event that galvanizes attention; maybe 
it’s a slow, steady movement of people starting within the general 
populace, a certain view about something that they didn’t have 
previously. Whatever it is, there’s something that creates this effect of 
an opportunity, a temporary window, for something to happen. 
Once that something happens, then you have this sort of 
competition among different types of solutions that are being proposed. 
Obviously politics is involved here too, but really I think at this point 
again, members of Congress often really do want to understand and try 
to come up with good solutions. They have their prisms like all the rest 
of us do, in terms of how they look at things, but that’s the point at 
which I think what happens in academia can be translated into actual 
solutions, and then harnessed by folks at organizations like Public 
Knowledge, companies like Google, and others who are out there trying 
to articulate what they think is right for the public good. Then the 
political process engages; whether it’s successful or not involves lots of 
variables there as well. 
If you think about it in that context, there really is ample room for 
academia to become engaged. And then turning to the political side of 
it, we need to find out how to harness the forces like we had with 
SOPA/PIPA, like we’re having now with the cell phone locking issue. 
We need to start to get people engaged from the bottom up, not the top 
down, to be effective advocates to try to make these kinds of changes. 
 
SHERWIN SIY: I guess I would just be giving my impressions, but 
staffers aren't going to read a law review article, right?  I mean if I write 
something that's five pages long it's too long, cut it down.  They have 
time for one page.  That's not to disparage them at all because what they 
have on their plate is impressive in terms of what they need to process 
in a day. 
 That doesn't mean that those law review articles are useless 
because they provide the backing for shorter pieces that can come out of 
the academy, can come from professors, can come from anybody really 
but they provide the necessary background and the necessary actual 
research that gives those arguments credence. Literally you will see 
proposals coming out of offices, right, that have ideas, concepts within 
them, and they're not entirely sure where they came from.  You'll see 
them, these ideas proposed in papers 10, 15 years old. 
  
JESSICA LITMAN: As someone with no Hill experience whatsoever, I 
think something that academics can do (easier once you have tenure 
than before you do) is to write and talk about the problem in ways that 
infect other folks with the virus of your idea so that they don’t even 
know where it comes from, but other people catch it. 
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: [inaudible question about cell-phone locking 
legislation] 
 
DEREK KHANNA: With the unlocking issue in particular I wanted to 
engage in civil disobedience but people were very scared of being 
arrested for unlocking their phones. 
I feel like the IP community is a community that’s not as 
acclimated to the tools of civil disobedience as other communities have 
been in the past. Maybe that’s a broad statement but that’s my 
impression. If you disagree with me and you want to join me in 
engaging in civil disobedience and getting arrested in the Library of 
Congress, let me know, because I will join you. 
 
JESSICA LITMAN: It is worth noting that the Organization for 
Transformative Works started out supporting what seemed at the time to 
be civil disobedience. It actually succeeded in nudging the law several 
inches towards sanity. Back when OTW decided “we’re going to post 
your fan works in an archive on the Internet even though most people 
don’t think it’s legal to do that,” it took an enormous legal risk, although 
it spoke for a community of committed folks who were going to be 
doing what they were doing anyway. 
 
SHERWIN SIY: Carl Malamud's digitizing, you know, copyrighted 
building codes that have been incorporated by reference into municipal 
and state codes.  He's putting them up online.  I don't think his objective 
is to get sued.  I don't think he wants to be a test case but he's doing it.  
And as he does it I mean I think we saw this with D.C. recently with the 
District of Columbia's laws.  He digitized them, told people he was 
doing that, put them up online, and D.C. recently said, oh, you know 
what, yeah, we will put an unofficial version of the code on our website.  
I there's definitely room for it.  I think that it depends upon what—
where you're doing this.  I mean it's easy for somebody to be 
characterized as wrapping themselves in the mantle of civil 
disobedience when they want a free album.  There was an essay 
somebody wrote fairly recently and I wish I could remember who so I 
could cite them properly talking about Thoreau and the origins of--and 
his essay and the fact is he went to--he was in prison because he refused 
to pay taxes to support the Mexican War.  The connection between what 
law he was violating and his political objective was not quite as distinct 
as I think we normally would want an act of civil disobedience to be, to 
send the message about that, right?  I mean just because--anybody with 
a generalized grievance against the government stops paying taxes and 
the you know your tax, I'm sorry, you're not paying taxes.  You're a… 
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Right.  I mean--yeah, he's a Committee chairman but his district is his 
district, right?  The people who are voting for or against him are in that 
particular area.  Their interests, unless it's a particularly copyright nerdy 
district, these issues aren't going to be election issues generally.  Not 
yet. 
 
RICK WHITT: I was going to just point out that the very nature of what 
it is to be disobedient in a civil manner, you know, what does that mean 
now in the age of the Internet?  It’s about acts, about posting your things 
online. It’s about saying things online. It’s less about getting arrested in 
the halls of the Library of Congress, which I think can still be every 
effective, but it also to me means if you’re trying to make a point with 
members of Congress who tend not to be as technically savvy, it may 
not have the same kind of impact as chaining yourself to the Library of 
Congress walls and refusing to leave. 
Think about SOPA/PIPA again, that was in large sense a virtual 
protest. You didn’t have thousands of people in the streets with big 
banners. It was people basically sending emails and websites going 
down or putting up particular points of view on their opening pages. 
What it is to be civil disobedient in the twenty-first century, I think is a 
really fascinating question, particularly because of this chasm between 
the folks who have now the tools of the Internet and the people, the 
audiences, we’re trying to reach in Washington who oftentimes don’t 
really get it. 
